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Abstract
My thesis revolves around the question of how information asymmetries affect elections. In
particular, I am interested in how electoral concerns shape policy choices and in the effects
of institutional arrangements aimed to providing voters with information on politicians.
In the first chapter I model a primary election, i.e. an election to choose a candidate. I
show that if party members do not know the quality of candidates, high quality candidates
distinguish themselves by proposing more extreme policies. As a result, introducing pri-
mary elections increases the quality of candidates but it might lead to policy polarization.
The second chapter, which is my job market paper, develops a model in which a politician
takes a repeated action over an issue and is evaluated by a voter through an election. I
show that politicians who flip-flop, i.e. change their decision on the issue, are penalized
by voters, because flip-flopping signals incompetence. As a result, politicians have an
incentive to protect their reputation by inefficiently sticking to their initial policy choice.
This decreases the quality of both policy and electoral choices. The paper also discusses
how changes in transparency and term limits can discipline the behaviour of politicians.
My third and final chapter, which is joint work with Antoni-Italo de Moragas, describes a
media market in which a set of news outlets compete to break a news concerning a politician
in office; after receiving a signal of whether the politician is corrupt, media outlets can either
fact-check and learn the truth, or publish the news immediately. We show that increasing
the number of outlets competing in the market results in less fact-checking and more fake
corruption scandals being published. By making the re-election of honest incumbents more
difficult, the increase in competition might therefore be detrimental to social welfare.
1

1 Signalling Valence in Primary Elections
I build a model of two-stage elections in which candidates differ in terms of a privately-
observed quality dimension (valence) and they commit to a policy platform before the
primary election. I show that primaries select better candidates at the cost of increased
polarization. I also endogenize the choice of holding primaries and find that it can lead
to asymmetric equilibria, in which only one political party holds primaries. This outcome
is consistent for example with the history of several social-democratic parties in Europe,
which were often holding primaries while their opponent right-wing parties were not.
1.1 Introduction
“Mr. Trump’s outrageous statements signal that he has some other political virtue some
voters value.”
Justin Wolfers
In 2010, Charlie Bass decided to enter the Republican primary for the House of Represen-
tatives in New Hampshire’s second congressional district. An experienced career politician
with a moderate resume, and a member of the centrist group Republican Main Street
Partnership, Bass performed a considerable shift during his primary campaign, frequently
appearing at Tea party rallies and taking conservative positions on salient issues such as
taxes and abortion 1. His move proved successful, propelling him to the primary victory
and subsequently to a narrow victory against Democrat Anne McLane Kuster 2.
Also the recent election of Donald Trump as 45th president of the United States of
America is an interesting example of primary election extremism. A seemingly moderate
if not even Democratic-leaning New Yorker, Mr Trump emerged as a dark-horse candidate
1During the campaign, for example, he signed an anti-tax pledge by the Tea-Party related group Americans
for Prosperity.
2As a matter of fact, there are several other Republican politicians in North-Eastern states who in the
same period have followed tactics similar to Bass’ in a successful manner: two examples are the primary
race between Joe Malone and Jeff Perry in the Congress primary in Massachusetts and that between
Linda McMahon and Rob Simmons in the Connecticut Senate primary.
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and shocked the world with a primary election campaign in which he took radical positions
on many crucial issues, such as immigration and international trade 3.
Was the move to the right performed by these candidates just a way to cater to partisan
primary voters, or is there more to that? Why would non-ideological candidates risk
jeopardizing their general election prospects with extreme proposal that do not resonate
well with the moderate electorate? The point is that the policy platform is not all a
politician has to offer: voters also value other qualities such as competence, integrity, or
the fact of being an outsider to the establishment. However, given the more intangible
character of these qualities, it is fundamental for a politician to find a way to credibly
convey that he is competent, honest or truly different from establishment politicians.
In this paper I propose a mechanism by which politicians use the policy platforms pro-
posed in a primary election to send voters a signal of their quality (valence). As Justin
Wolfers wrote in the New York Times concerning Trump’s proposal of a complete shut
down of Muslims from the United States, the economic theory of signalling “suggests that
his statement is less a calculated attempt at feeding a demand for bigotry and more an
effort to fuel the hunger for authenticity”. This is precisely what happens in my model:
valent politicians run on platforms which are more extreme than those party voters would
ideally want them to propose, but the additional extremism serves the purpose of convinc-
ing voters about the candidate’s valence.
The intuition for this result is the following: first of all, primary elections make sure that
politicians need to develop a platform well in advance of the general election. At that stage,
politicians are likely to still not be very well known by voters. Between the primary and
the general election, however, there is plenty of time in order for voters to learn about the
quality of a politician, thanks to the discussion on the media and the increased attention
politicians receive. For example, a scandal might reveal the candidate’s incompetence or
dishonesty. In this environment, a non-valent politician running on an extreme platform
runs the risk of getting caught: not being able to change his policy position, the candidate
would see his chances of winning the general election sharply reduced. This allows valent
politicians to separate from non-valent ones by choosing an extreme enough platform that
discourages non-valent politicians from mimicking them.
If this mechanism holds, then the existence of primary elections creates an important
trade-off: primary elections make it possible to select more valent politicians, but also lead
to increased polarization of platforms.
Do these stylized facts square with the evidence we have on the effects of primary elec-
3Some particularly famous examples are the statement concerning the wall on the border with Mexico,
the ban on Muslim migrants and the idea of fully renegotiating NAFTA and exiting from the TPP.
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tions? As far as candidate quality is concerned, Snyder and Hirano 2014 show that open-
seat primary elections of the advantaged party in a safe district are effective at selecting
high quality candidates 4. A question that naturally arises is therefore what mechanism
lies behind the improved selection of candidates achieved by primary elections, and the
aim of the paper is to describe one possible such mechanism.
Along with improving the quality of candidates, primary elections are often associated
with polarization: an explanation that is often given is that voters participating in pri-
maries (especially closed) tend to be a selected sample of politically engaged partisans.
From an empirical point of view, however, this question is still not settled: Hirano, Sny-
der, Ansolabehere, and Hansen (2010), for example, find no conclusive evidence of a link
between primaries and polarization. At the same time, however, there are also studies
suggesting the existence of an effect: Brady, Han, and Pope (2007), for example, find that
candidates that are too close to the general electorate preferences suffer a penalty in pri-
mary elections 5. In light of this conflicting evidence, a reasonable hypothesis is to think
that primaries lead to polarization only under some conditions: had the anti-Washington
mood not been so strong in the 2010 congressional primary, Charlie Bass would have prob-
ably run on a more moderate platform. In other words, this model provides a possible
explanation of what the factors needed for primaries to result in higher polarization are.
Finally, another important stylized fact about primaries concerns the decision of holding
them: although now fully part of the US electoral system, the subset of countries which
regularly use primaries is rather limited 6. Moreover, it is sometimes the case that only
one major political party 7 uses them, as it happened several times in Italy, France and in
many South American countries. How can this phenomenon be explained? Would parties
benefit from primaries being compulsory? As I explain later, this research is also capable
4Although they do not directly measure quality, Carey and Polga-Hecimovic 2006 find that candidates
elected through primaries perform better than candidates selected without a primary elections using a
sample of Latin American elections.
5Whereas Ansolabehere et al. use the introduction of mandatory primaries to answer their question,
the majority of studies looking at the connection between primary elections and polarization use the
variation (either cross section of in the time-series) in the degree of openness of primary elections: in
this context, McGhee, Masket, Shor, and McCarty (2014) find little variation in candidate polarization,
whereas Kaufmann, Gimpel, and Hoffman (2003) and Elisabeth R. Gerber (1998) suggest that closed
primaries select more polarized candidates than open primaries. Bullock and Clinton (2011), on the
other hand, find a polarizing effect of primaries only in competitive districts.
6See Carey and Polga-Hecimovic (2006) and Kemahlioglu and Hirano (2009) for a discussion of the use
of primaries in Latin America; in Europe, primaries have been used in several countries including Italy,
France, Greece and Spain.
7In particular, especially in Europe, it seems that when primaries are held in only one party, centre-left
parties are more likely to hold them: examples include the Partito Democratico in Italy, the PS in
France (although the UMP is set to hold primaries for the coming election, too), the PASOK in Greece,
the Labour Party in the UK.
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of providing answers to these questions.
The model I develop is a simple Downsian model of a two-stage election. Two potential
candidates are drawn to compete in the primary, the winner becoming the candidate for
the general election against an incumbent. Candidates are office-oriented but they are able
to commit to the policy they choose when entering the primary election race. The key
feature of the model is that valence is private information of candidates at the time of the
primary election, but there is a positive chance that it gets revealed before the general
election: as anticipated above, this can be thought of as the probability that a scandal
emerges in the time interval between the primaries and the general election, or as the fact
that general election valence can sometimes only be observed once the general election
campaign starts and the primary nominee is pitched against the incumbent. These two
ingredients - commitment 8 and the possibility of valence being revealed 9 - make platform
choice a credible signal of valence.
The main result of the paper is that in such a model, under some conditions there
exists a unique separating equilibrium in which valent candidates differentiate themselves
by choosing more partisan platforms. In other words, primaries manage to select better
candidates even if valence is unobservable at the time of primaries, but they do it at the
cost of increased polarization. This result goes in the opposite direction compared to what
happens in models where valence is publicly known, such as Hummel (2013). In such
models, valent candidates pick more moderate platforms than their competitors, since the
observability of valence gives them a bargaining power which they do not have in my model.
Moreover, the outcome of primaries in my model is that voters will not only choose valent
candidates, but they will also like their platforms more than those of their non-valent
opponents in terms of liberal-conservative location.
My result can also help shed some light on the relationship between electorate and plat-
form polarization. Even in districts in which polarizing forces such as the Tea Party or con-
fessional organizations such as the Evangelical Church play a secondary role, as for example
in the New Hampshire district where Charlie Bass won his congressional race, politicians
willing to showcase qualities such as integrity and willingness to act independently from the
establishment might take polarizing partisan positions. With such a mechanism in place,
the polarization of candidates’ platforms does not require polarization in the underlying
electorate 10.
8If flip-flops were possible, but still costly to the politician, then my result would not change. As examples
of primary elections models with flip-flopping see Hummel (2010) and Agranov (2016).
9Snyder and Ting (2011) build their model on a similar assumption, according to which the type of
politician can be revealed before or after the primaries.
10There is an open debate on whether the American electorate is becoming more polarized. Abramowitz
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Last but not least, concerning the question of whether parties will choose to hold pri-
maries, I show that there are several possibilities: apart from the two polar cases in which
primaries are either held or not held by both parties, there is an intermediate region in
which the only pure-strategy equilibria are asymmetric and involve only one party holding
primaries, which reflects the examples of countries in which only one major party holds
primaries. Notice that given the linearity of preferences I use in my model, parties would
always prefer an equilibrium where both candidates are selected through primaries, but
that is not always sustainable: the model therefore suggests that political parties should
be in favour of making primary elections compulsory11.
1.2 Related Literature
My paper mainly relates to the literature on primary elections, adding the novel feature of
signalling valence through the choice of a more radical political platform. More generally,
however, this paper develops a theory on the interaction between candidate valence and
policy platform choice: in this respect, an important reference is Kartik and McAfee (2007):
in both models, valent candidates (or candidates with character, as they call them) are more
extreme than non-valent ones, but whereas in their model it is up to non-valent candidates
to locate in such a way to maximize their probability of winning elections, in my model it is
valent candidates who strategically take more extreme positions in order to separate from
non-valent candidates 12. Another similarity between the models is that the more frequent
valent candidates are, the more extreme a policy needs to be in order for voters to know that
the candidate is valent: in their model, this happens because the support of policies chosen
by strategic candidates broadens, whereas in mine the reason is that valent candidates need
to pick more extreme policies to signal their valence. What is more, Kartik and McAfee
also show how their mechanism translates into a simple two-stage election setup: when
some candidates have character, what they call “General Election Indifference” can exist.
In this respect, my paper can be seen as an extension of their work, focusing on two-stage
elections and fully strategic candidates.
Whereas the aforementioned paper by Kartik and McAfee is the one sharing the most
(2010) argues that the American public is getting more polarized, whereas studies such as Seth J. Hill
(2015) find that the polarization of the electorate has not increased.
11A caveat to this conclusion, however, lies in the fact that my model does not take into account the
potential advantage that party elites might have from being able to choose candidates directly rather
than through a primary election process, which might favour anti-establishment outsiders.
12Moreover, in my model both types are strategic, whereas in Kartik and McAfee (2007) valent candidates
are non-strategic.
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common ground in terms of relation between valence and candidate location, the most
similar study in terms of model setup is Hummel (2013). What is interesting in the
comparison between my paper and Hummel’s is the fact that the assumption of privately
observed valence I make in my model significantly changes the result: in Hummel’s paper,
valent candidates choose more moderate policy platforms than non-valent ones: the reason
is that when valence is observable, it is sufficient for valent politicians to make voters
indifferent between them and more partisan non-valent candidates and be in a better
position to win the general election. My contribution might therefore also be seen as a
way to qualify Hummel’s result and underline how the observability of valence is crucial in
obtaining his result. Moreover, my model can also be though of as a way to bring some of
the ideas of Kartik and McAfee inside a primary election model a la Hummel 13.
Another paper that finds a similar connection between candidate location and valence
is Casas (2014): in his model, voters cannot observe policies before elections, but they can
observe party affiliation and valence. An implication of his model which is similar to my
findings is that valent candidates are more ideologically volatile, hence more likely to be
extreme. In other words, policy moderation implies a lower valence, just as in my model.
The interesting parallelism between the two papers is that the complementarity between
valence and moderation turns into substitutability when either policy preferences (as in
Casas) or valence (as in my paper) become unobservable. Another similar implication of the
two papers is that the smaller the differentiation, the more profitable the “investment” in
valence (i.e. primaries in my model) is. However, the unobservability of policy as opposed to
valence in Casas’ paper also brings about some differences: in his model, the more moderate
the “nominator” is (i.e. the more open primaries are), the lower the valence of candidates.
This is due to the fact that a moderate nominator dislikes policy variance. In my model,
on the other hand, primaries increase the probability of selecting valent candidates. In
other words, whereas in both models valence and moderation are substitutes given an
institutional setup, in Casas’ model they are complements across institutional setups: this
means that, unlike what I conclude in my model, his model predicts that (closed) primaries
select more partisan platforms but also less valent ones compared to handpicking by the
party leader.
As we have seen, Casas (2014) analyzes the effects of candidate nomination rules on party
platforms and candidate valence. Whereas I don’t study the difference between closed and
13It is also useful to point out that if Hummel’s is the primary election paper that mostly resembles mine,
there are other similar models in the literature, all differing along some features: Grofman, Troumpounis,
and Xefteris (2016) consider both closed and open primaries with candidates of potentially different
(observable) valence and sincere voting; Takayama (2014) Adams and Merrill (2008)
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open primaries, I do address the question of whether a party would like to hold (closed)
primaries. In this respect, my paper is similar to Serra (2011): in both models, the trade-off
for party leaders is that handpicking the candidate gives them control over the platform
but results in a lower chance of selecting a valent candidate. In his paper, however, the
increased probability of getting a valent candidate through the primaries is an assumption of
the model, whereas the improved selection of candidates occurs endogenously in my model.
In this respect, this paper provides a microfoundation of Serra’s guiding assumption.
Finally, the problem of deciding to hold primaries is addressed also by Snyder and Ting
(2011): in their model, the cost of primaries is that they can reveal the candidate as being
bad before the general election. For this reason, they conclude that primaries are optimal in
sufficiently safe districts. The implication of my model, on the other hand, is that primaries
are more likely to be optimal in when parties are not very differentiated (which is to say in
competitive districts): this result is particularly interesting because at first sight it appears
counterintuitive. In a competitive district, as a matter of fact, policy polarization is more
costly for the general election, but it is also simpler for valent politicians to separate.
Moreover, the policy cost of losing the election is smaller in competitive districts than in
safe districts.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 3 will present the model in which only one
party holds a primary election: I call this the single-primary model. The main results from
this model are described in Section 4, along with a discussion and a welfare analysis. After
that, Section 5 presents a more general version of the model, in which both parties hold
primaries. The case of endogenous primaries is also treated there. Section 6 concludes.
1.3 The Baseline Model
I build a very simple two-stage election game based on a standard Downsian spatial voting
model. A unit mass of citizens have policy preferences distributed over the x ∈ [0, 1]
interval. All that matters about the distribution of voters is that there is a median voter
m who is randomly located in the [12 − ǫ, 12 + ǫ] interval following a uniform distribution.
There are two political parties, whose policy bliss points are for simplicity fixed at the
extremes of the interval: I call the party located at 0 Democratic party and the party
located at 1 Republican party, or D and R respectively. The policies proposed by each
party in the general election are denoted by r and d respectively. The voters of each party
are identical and their condition of party voters is predetermined and fixed throughout
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the whole model 14. There are two stages of elections: in the first stage, the primaries,
platforms and candidates are selected. In this stage, parties choose one candidate between
two randomly drawn politicians. As soon as their are drawn, politicians propose a platform
and commit to their choice for the whole game. In the second stage, the general election,
the two winners of the primaries face each other and every citizen votes for one of these two
candidates. In other words, this is a model of closed primary elections, because only party
members vote in the primaries. Politicians are purely office motivated, receiving a utility of
1 if elected in the general election and 0 otherwise. There are two types of politicians, valent
and non-valent. The share of valent politicians in the population of potential candidates of
both parties is α. Valence is a set of non-policy characteristics of a politician that provide
utility to all voters across the ideological spectrum: these characteristics can be thought of
as honesty, work ethics, international reputation but also as campaigning ability. I assume
that valence is binary, so that a valent politician has valence vj = v, whereas a non-valent
politician has valence vj = 0. Voters’ utility is additively linear in the elected politician’s
valence and the distance between his policy platform pj and the voter’s bliss point xi:
U(xi, vj , pj) = vj − |pj − xi|
In the first stage, when the primaries take place, valence is private information of politicians.
In the baseline version of the model, I assume that after the primaries take place, valence
is exogenously revealed with probability 1: this model is therefore particularly apt at
considering valence as general election campaigning ability or popularity with the general
electorate. The fact that valence can be exogenously revealed after primaries is similar to
what Snyder and Ting (2011) assume in their model, and it particularly fits the case of any
attribute that gives a politician an electoral advantage and that is acknowledged by voters
following the primaries. Moreover, the more general case where valence is only revealed
with some probability z ∈ (0, 1) is very similar and it is treated in the extensions. When
voting in the primary stage, party members are fully rational: they maximize their expected
utility by taking into account the policy platform but also the probability of winning that
each candidate faces in the general election given his policy platform and expected valence.
To further simplify the problem, for now I assume that a primary election only takes place
within the Democratic party, whereas the Republican party candidate is already set at
location r and I normalize his valence to zero. Moreover, I assume that r ≥ 12 . A useful
notation that will be used throughout the model is r˜ ≡ r − (12 − ǫ), which denotes the
14The party bliss point could also be thought of as the bliss point of the decisive median voter inside the
party.
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dstance between the Republican policy and the most leftwing media voter. The analogue
expression for the Democratic policy d is therefore d˜ ≡ 12 − ǫ − d. I further assume that
valence is not too large, and in particular that v ≤ r˜. This assumption makes sure that a
valent democratic candidate located at 12 − ǫ would not win the election for sure. To sum
up, the timing of the model is the following:
1. Two Democratic primary candidates are drawn.
2. Primary candidates simultaneously choose a policy platform.
3. Party members observe the platforms and choose one candidate.
4. All citizens observe the valence of the chosen democratic candidate and vote in the
general election.
5. The winning policy is implemented and payoffs are distributed.
At the heart of the model, in other words, is the fact that parties (for now only the Demo-
cratic party) have to choose a candidate before valence is revealed: the fact that politicians
cannot change their platforms after primary elections gives politicians the possibility to
credibly signal their valence, as we will see in the next sections.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 General Election
In order to understand the solution of the game I start from the second stage, i.e. the
general election. Once the Democratic party primary has taken place and the Democratic
platform is set to d , the game is a standard Downsian election with the possibility of a
valence advantage v for the Democratic politician. The winning party is determined by
the location of the median voter m compared to that of the indifferent voter z ≡ d+r+v2 :
D wins if m ≤ z and R wins if m > z. The probability of winning for the Democratic
candidate is:
π(d, r, v) =
1
2
+
1
4ǫ
(d+ r + v − 1)
The value of π is important since it defines the politicians’ payoff conditional on winning
the primary.
In order to understand primary election behaviour, the first step is to study party pref-
erences. As mentioned above, parties maximize the expected utility of a candidate’s policy,
thus trading off location and electability. This turns out to be particularly simple thanks
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to the assumption of a linear utility function: neither valence nor the opponent’s location
affect the utility maximizing location of the Democratic candidate, which uniquely depends
on the median uncertainty parameter ǫ:
Lemma 1. In the general election, the location maximizing the Democratic party’s utility
is d∗ = 12 − ǫ.
Proof. See Appendix 1.B.
1.4.2 The Primary Election
The heart of the model is the primary election. Since I do not model disagreement within
the party 15 party members vote unanimously, as if a single party entity was taking the
decision. Moreover, given that two candidates are randomly drawn from the pool 16 there
are three possibilities: both are valent, none is valent or only one is valent. Without
private information over valence, primaries would have no effect other than that of getting
politicians to compete and locate at d∗, which is an outcome equivalent to the party having
direct control over the candidate. With private information over valence, candidates can
use the primaries to send signals about their valence. The way this works is simple: the
policy platform announced before the primary election remains the same for the general
election and therefore choosing a platform further away from the expected median decreases
a politician’s probability of winning the general election. Valent politicians, however, are
able to perform better thanks to their valence. It follows that if valent politicians choose an
extreme enough policy, they prevent non-valent politicians from mimicking them, making
their platform choice a credible signal of valence. This, however, is only feasible if, despite
their lower chances of success in the general election, party voters are willing to elect
signalling politicians in the primaries, which requires the following condition to hold:
Condition 1. ρ˜ ≡ vr˜ ≥
√
1+(2−α)2
2−α − 1.
Derivation. See Appendix 1.B.
The main result of the paper can be summarized in the following theorem:
15Two things have to be noted: first, even with disagreement within the party, results would not change
as long as the median voter theorem applies. What is more, even if assuming that party voters are
distributed in some interval, given these preferences their first-best policy choice d∗ would be the same
for all of them if x < 1
2
− ǫ.
16The fact that two and not more candidates are drawn is arbitrary and chosen for simplicity; in fact, an
interesting question, which I will partially address in the extensions, concerns the optimal number of
candidates drawn for the primaries.
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Theorem 1. Assume that Condition 1 holds. Then, the Democratic primary election
game has a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in which low-valence candidates locate at
dL = d
∗ = 12 − ǫ and high-valence candidates locate at dH = 12 − ǫ− 12−α r˜. This equilibrium
is the only one which survives the Intuitive Criterion by Cho and Kreps (1987).
Proof. In a separating equilibrium, valent candidates know that they will win the primary
with probability 1 − α2 , since they only lose if also the other candidate is valent and they
are not selected in the random tie-breaking. Non-valent politicians, on the other hand, can
still enjoy the probability of winning the primaries if none of the two candidates is valent,
which from their perspective translates in a winning probability of (1−α)2 . It follows that
politicians can credibly signal their valence by moving their platform to the left. The size
of this movement is given by the incentive compatibility constraint for low types, which
reads:
1− α
2
[
1
2
+
1
4ǫ
(dL + r − 1)
]
≥
(
1− α
2
)[1
2
+
1
4ǫ
(dH + r − 1)
]
and yields
dH ≤ 1− α
2− αdL +
1
2− α(1− 2ǫ− r)
Thanks to the intuitive criterion, all platform choices satisfying the above condition will
be attributed to the valent type; ceteris paribus, valent politicians prefer to locate closer
to the center, so that in the unique separating equilibrium, the above constraint will hold
with equality.
In order to pin down the location of dL, notice that politicians are office-motivated, but
in the primary election they are pitched against each other and this leads them to compete.
Hence, if dL 6= d∗ = 12 − ǫ in a separating equilibrium, any deviation to some dˆ closer to d∗
will lead the non valent politician to win for sure at least whenever the other candidate is
another non-valent politician locating at dL. The reason is simply that d
∗ is the bliss point
for party voters, and in a separating equilibrium beliefs are already the worst possible for
a politician at dL, i.e. µ = 0. For the same reason, any non-valent politician deviating out
of d∗ in a separating equilibrium will never win the primary (unless she were to deviate to
dH , of course, but that is already ruled out by the incentive compatibility constraint).
In order to see that a pooling equilibrium is also not sustainable, consider without loss
of generality a pooling at d∗: a movement to the left of d˜ ≥ r˜2 will be interpreted as coming
from the valent type, given the intuitive criterion 17. Then, however, any valent politician
would strictly profit by carrying out such a deviation, as it can be immediately verified.
17This simply comes from the incentive compatibility constraint when low types win with probability 1
2
in
the pooling equilibrium at d∗ and deviating results in winning with probability 1
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In terms of comparative statics, the movement to the left that valent democratic politi-
cians have perform is d˜H =
1
2−α r˜. This means that the higher α is, the more radical the
signalling policy becomes: when α moves closer to 1, the separating policy moves towards
a policy with zero winning probability in the general election for a hypothetical non-valent
candidate mimicking the valent type’s policy: this is intuitive since as α goes to 1, the
probability to win the primary election for a non-valent politician goes to zero.
Moreover, the further to the right is the location of the Republican opponent, the more
movement to the left is required from the Democratic candidate. In other words, primaries
contribute to political polarizarion. Notice that r˜ might also be interpreted as a parameter
representing district safety, or the advantage of the Democratic party: the interpretation
hence would be that primary elections create more polarization in safer districts 18. Notice
that the valence of the Democratic politician does not affect the movement necessary to
signal, which depends on the probability of winning of the non-valent candidate. If the Re-
publican candidate were valent himself, what’s more, the signalling location would become
more moderate, because the low-valence candidate would win with a lower probability 19.
In terms of probability of winning the general election, valent politicians, notwithstanding
their more partisan platform, win the general election more often than non-valent ones as
long as vr˜ ≥ 12−α , so that below that threshold primaries actually decrease the expected
probability of seeing a valent (Democratic) politician in office. Overall, the probability
(compared to a hypothetical pooling equilibrium) of electing a valent politician in the
general election increases as long as vr˜ ≥ α1−α . The interpretation of this threshold in terms
of district safety is that primary elections increase the presence of valent politicians in
competitive districts, while they decrease it in safe districts (the level of safety depending
on the likelihood of drawing a valent politician α). This seems at first sight to be at
odds with the evidence presented by Snyder and Hirano (2014), but allowing for a larger
share of valent candidates in safe districts could bring my results in line with theirs. The
comparative statics of the model can be collected in the following proposition:
Corollary 1. Primary elections generate increasingly partisan platforms whenever α is
larger (more valent politicians in the challenger pool) or r˜ is larger (i.e. more partisan
18The fact that the more advantaged the party is, the more valent candidates have to be radical in order
to win the primary partially offsets the initial advantage of the party. In other words, the signalling
happening in my model acts to make what Grofman, Troumpounis, and Xefteris (2016) call matching
effect of primaries smaller, making competitiveness across districts more homogeneous.
19Adjusting the model to deal with a valent opponent is straightforward and yields a separating location
of d˜H ≥
1
2−α
(r˜ − v).
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Republican candidate or safer district). Conditional on winning the primary, valent politi-
cians still win general elections more often than non-valent politicians as long as vr˜ ≥ 12−α .
Moreover, the probability of electing a valent politician in the general election, compared to
a hypothetical pooling equilibrium, increases as long as vr˜ ≥ α1−α .
As a final note, in the model I assume that valence is a quality benefitting all voters across
the ideology line, but the results would not change, except for some welfare comparisons,
if I assumed that valence is only benefitting the (in this case Democratic) party voter and
the median voter.
1.4.3 Discussion
Having presented the main result of the paper, it is now useful to discuss some of the
features of the model. The main insight of the theorem presented above is that in a
primary election where candidates can commit to a policy platform, choosing relatively
extreme positions can be an instrument to signal a politician’s valence. Two things seem
particularly worthy of a discussion: the first one is the main prediction of the model, i.e.
the fact that, in a primary election, valent (i.e. good) candidates will tend to propose more
partisan policies than non valent ones.
On one hand, there is some evidence point to the fact that valent primary candidates
choose more moderate policies (See for example Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart III
(2001), Stone and Simas (2010) and Brady, Han, and Pope (2007)). However, there are
also elements pointing in the opposite direction: for example, Stone and Simas (2010) shows
that challengers choosing more extreme platforms have a higher probability of replacing the
incumbent in House elections; similarly, Brady, Han, and Pope (2007) and Hirano, Snyder,
Ansolabehere, and Hansen (2010) show that ideologically moderate incumbents are more
vulnerable to primary challenges. All these findings are compatible with the results of my
model. Notice that even if it were the case that valent candidates take more moderate
positions on average, this could just mean that valence is more likely to be observable (or,
if we have both observable and unobservable valence, that the former effect dominates):
the reason is that with observable valence, valent candidates would play more moderate
policies, such as in Hummel (2013). Moreover, the situation my model described most
accurately is one in which a primary needs to decide the candidate who will challenge
an incumbent from the opposing party: in other words, the Democratic primary in a
Republican district or viceversa.
The second issue that I would like to discuss is the possibility that this kind of signalling
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could also happen in a context different from that of a primary election 20. However, the
two fundamental ingredients, which is to say the possibility to commit to a policy platform
and the sequentiality whereby valence is private information at the moment of choosing
the platform but can be exogenously revealed before the general election, suggest that the
context of primaries might be the most likely to see this type of signalling happen. Apart
from the sequentiality issue, which is straightforward, it seems plausible to assume that
participating in a primary offers a much better commitment-to-policy device than writing
a political manifesto within the walls of a party’s smoke-filled-room. As a matter of fact,
in a later section I will briefly describe an alternative model, in which it is the party who
selects candidates by offering a menu of platforms: valent politicians will take the more
partisan platform compared to non-valent ones. However, the commitment assumption
appears less realistic in that model: without the exposure given by a primary, it is less
credible for politicians taking the more partisan platform to not flip-flop when running in
an actual election. Of course it has to be taken into consideration that in this model the
absence of flip-flopping is not derived endogenously, but rather ruled out by assumption.
The discussion about the screening alternative, which as you will see later on in the
paper is, as intuition suggests, superior to primaries, leads me to the other point that I
would like to consider: the comparison between an environment with primary elections
and an alternative environment. To this moment, as a matter of fact, I have not specified
how the selection of candidates would work if primary elections where not held. Apart
from the theoretically optimal candidate screening, there are several other possibilities,
of which I will just mention some benchmarks: the first one is to think that without
primaries, candidates would be completely unrestrained by the party. In that case, we
could imagine that they would run on a moderate platform 21 such as 12 . On the other
hand, we might think that without primaries, the party will choose an insider to run as
candidate, but that this candidate can never have the extra valence. Lastly, we might think
that without primaries, the party can get candidates to run at d∗, but that candidates are
just randomly drawn from the pool of politicians: in this case, no primaries would be
equivalent to a pooling equilibrium. When talking about the welfare effects of primary
elections, therefore, one alternative has to be picked as no-primary benchmark. In the
following paragraph I will use the pooling equilibrium at d∗ as benchmark.
20Since I do not model the possibility of ideological differences between the party elite and the party median
voter, in my model holding primaries means letting candidates propose a platform.
21Since r is exogenously fixed in this version of the model, a politician free to locate would choose a position
just to the left of r, unless this is not exactly 1
2
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1.4.4 Welfare Analysis
The fundamental trade-off driving the welfare comparisons is between more extreme policies
and valence of politicians. Let’s start by looking at politicians’ welfare. As in all signalling
games, a separating equilibrium potentially favours the types carrying out the signalling,
which in this case is valent politicians. Non-valent politicians therefore lose compared to
a hypothetical pooling equilibrium where both primary candidates locate at d∗ and one is
picked at random (which is equivalent to having no primary elections). As far as valent
politicians are concerned, the trade off they face is that they are more likely to be chosen as
candidates for the general election, but at the same time they need to pick a more extreme
policy, so that their probability of winning the general election decreases. It turns out that
they only gain if the following condition is satisfied:
v
r˜
≥ α
1− α. (1.1)
This is (intuitively so) the same condition according to which the probability of seeing
valent candidates elected to office increases thanks to the primary. Valent politicians gain
if either the right-hand side is large, which happens if α is small (it’s easier to separate
when there are few good politicians), or if the left-hand side is small, which happens when
either r˜ is low (the Republican candidate is moderate, or the district is competitive) or v is
high (valence is high). Interestingly, politicians are more likely to gain from primaries when
the opponent is moderate (or the district is competitive) and that is because separating
requires a smaller movement to the extreme (in this case the left). Finally, notice that only
if α < 12 valent politicians can gain from the primaries under the assumption which binds
the value of valence 22 to vr˜ ≤ 1.
Consider now party welfare. As a result of primaries, the party can choose valent politi-
cians when they are available. Although valent politicians choose policies that are closer
to the party ideal, they win the general election less often. As a result, the Democratic
party gains from primaries when either valence is high enough or the district is competitive
enough:
v
r˜
≥ 1
(2− α)
[
(1− α) +
√
(1−α)
(2−α) [1 + (1− α)(2− α)]
] . (1.2)
Notice from (1.2) that as α grows closer to one, a point is reached where the party never
gains from primaries, since the right-hand side grows unboundedly but we assume that
22The assumption means that valence is never so large to make a hypothetical valent politician located at
1
2
− ǫ win the election for sure
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v
r˜ < 1; the intuition is that if the likelihood of having a valent politician is very high, there
is little reason to hold a primary.
An interesting question concerns the alignment of interests between valent politicians
and the party. By analyzing (1.1) and (1.2), one derives that there is a value of α above
which the party threshold is higher than the politician threshold. This means that if α is
large enough, then it is possible for parties to gain from primaries when politicians don’t
and viceversa if α is low enough. In the former case, politicians would prefer a pooling
equilibrium, but in this game they have no way to commit to it. In the latter case, the
party would gain from the ability to commit to rejecting a politician who signals that he
is valent. The possibility of these conflicts occurring is an indication of the importance of
electoral institutions regulating the primary election process.
What about the welfare of the Republican candidate and party? As far as the Republican
candidate is concerned, it is easy to show that he gains if
v
r˜
≤ 1
1− α.
Notice that this inequality is not just (1.1) with a flipped sign, since the Republican politi-
cian doesn’t know the type of candidate (valent or not valent) he will be facing.
As far as the Republican party is concerned, it gains from the Democratic party’s pri-
maries if vr˜ ≥ 1(2−α)−√2−α or if vr˜ ≤ 1(2−α)+√2−α , but notice that only the latter is relevant
because of the assumption that vr˜ ≤ 1. In other words, the Republican party gains from
the primaries when either valence is sufficiently low (which is intuitive) or when the district
is leaning to the Democratic side, i.e. high r˜: this is less intuitive but it is due to the fact
that a larger r˜ leads to more extreme (and therefore less competitive) valent Democratic
candidates.
Last but not least, the welfare of the median voter is characterized by an algebraically
harder condition to analyse:
v
r˜
≥ 1
(2− α)α
√
1+
(1−α)(3−2α)
α2(2−α)
−1
3−2α
The intuition, however, is analogous to that previously encountered: it takes either a
sufficiently high valence or a sufficient competitiveness of the district for the median voter
to gain from the institution of primaries.
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1.4.5 The Screening Alternative
In this section I describe the selection of politicians taking place if parties could screen
candidates by offering a menu of policy platforms. The intuition is the same as that
applying to the signalling model described in the paragraphs above, but with one important
difference. Since parties can choose the screening policies before drawing the two potential
candidates, they can choose the utility maximizing menu of policies, which can be either
a pooling or a separating one. As a consequence, not only pooling becomes feasible, but
the pair of separating policies are not the same as those described for the signalling model.
The reason is very simple: in the signalling model of primaries, candidates compete, and
party voters cannot commit not to vote for a candidate offering them their bliss point
once they have learnt about the candidate’s valence. This means that, in equilibrium, low
valence candidates have to locate at d∗ = 12 − ǫ. In the screening model, on the other hand,
the party is able to distort the policy offered to low valence politicians, making it more
moderate in order to make the separating policy offered to high valence politicians closer
to their bliss point. The result can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The candidate screening game has a unique equilibrium:
if ρ˜ <
√
1 + 4−α4(1−α)−1, then parties offer a pooling menu with d = d∗; if ρ˜ ≥
√
1 + 4−α4(1−α)−
1, then parties offer a separating menu of policies (dscrL , d
scr
H ), with d
scr
L ≥ d∗ and dscrH
satisfying the same incentive compatibility constraint as in the signalling game.
Proof. See Appendix 1.B.
1.5 Primaries in Both Parties
In this section I present a generalized version of the model, in which both parties con-
temporaneously hold a primary election. The consequence of having a double primary is
that, on each side, the separating equilibrium is played against an opponent of uncertain
location and valence. The core of the analysis is very similar to the single primary case:
under a condition analogous to Condition 1 for the single-primary model, the game has a
unique separating equilibrium in which candidates of both parties signal by choosing more
partisan platforms. Denote by ρ ≡ v2ǫ the double-primary environment analogue of ρ˜ = vr˜ .
The double primary non-rejection condition reads:
Condition 2. Assume that α and ρ satisfy the following condition: A(α)ρ2 + B(α)ρ −
C(α) ≥ 0, where ρ ≡ v2ǫ and A, B, C are functions of α derived in the appendix.
Derivation. See Appendix 1.B.
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The following proposition summarizes the main results of the double primary model:
Proposition 2. Assume that Condition 2 is satisfied. Then, the double primary game
has a unique separating equilibrium under the intuitive criterion. On the democratic side,
valent politicians separate by proposing platform:
d
dp
H = d
∗ − 1
1− α
[
2ǫ− α(2− α)v
(2− α)
]
, (1.3)
whereas non-valent politicians choose ddpL = d
∗ = 12 − ǫ. The locations of the R candidates
are rdpH = 1− ddpH and rdpL = 1− ddpL , hence the equilibrium is symmetric.
Proof. See Appendix 1.B.
As one can see from the expression for ddpH , there are two opposite effects at work, as
anticipated in the previous discussion: uncertainty in the opponent’s location and uncer-
tainty in the opponent’s valence. Uncertainty in the opponent’s location has a multiplier
effect on the movement required to separate, which is represented by the 11−α factor, which
was not present in the single primary expression: this strategic complementarity reinforces
the polarization effect of primaries. The multiplier effect is increasing in the frequency of
valent politicians. As far as the valence of the opponent is concerned, its effect is one of
strategic substitution which weakens the polarizing effect of primaries. It can be notices
that the numerator of the second term of (1.3) is simply the expected value of the oppo-
nent’s valence (notice that α(2 − α) = 1 − (1 − α)2, i.e. the probability that at least one
valent politician is drawn on one side). Up to the multiplier effect, therefore, this expres-
sion is equivalent to the separation condition in a single primary model with r = 12 + ǫ
and valence of v with probability α. Notice that compared to a single-primary case where
r˜ = 2ǫ, the movement to the left of the Democratic candidate in the double primary is
larger if and only if v2ǫ ≥ 12−α . As far as the discussion of welfare is concerned, a full anal-
ysis is beyond the scope of this section, but it can be noticed that, similarly to the single
primary case, where welfare depended on vr˜ , here the driver is
2ǫ
v and in particular valent
politicians gain when this ratio is low enough. The intuition is the following: a higher
v is an incentive to separate, since clearly it increases the probability of winning for any
given location. On the other hand, the smaller the uncertainty, the riskier the gamble of a
politician playing a separating equilibrium. As a matter of fact, for any given v moving to
the extreme means relying on the possibility of getting a favourable draw of the median:
this probability increases with the range 2ǫ along which the median moves.
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1.5.1 Endogenous Primary Choice
In the analysis of the previous paragraph I studied the equilibrium arising when both
parties hold primaries, but the question of whether parties would endogenously choose
to hold primaries remained unanswered. In this section I answer the question of what
would happen if both parties were to choose, at the beginning of the game, whether to
hold a primary or play a pooling equilibrium with candidates located at d∗. The result
is that depending on the parameters, there can be either a no-primary equilibrium (i.e.
an equilibrium in which parties do not hold primaries), or a double-primary equilibrium
(i.e. one in which both parties endogenously decide to hold a primary). However, it is also
possible for an asymmetric equilibrium to arise, in which only one party holds primaries 23.
Whenever asymmetric equilibria exist, there exists also a symmetric equilibrium in mixed
strategies, in which each party holds primaries with some interior probability. Intuitively,
the no primary equilibrium requires low values of v2ǫ , whereas the primary equilibrium
requires higher values of v2ǫ . Moreover, for α high enough the primary equilibrium ceases
to exist, whereas for very high levels of α the no-primary equilibrium is the unique outcome
of the game: the idea is simply that parties benefit from primaries when valence is not too
common among the pool of potential candidates.
Proposition 3. The endogenous double-primary game has three potential outcomes: for
some values of α and ρ, in the unique equilibrium parties choose not to hold primaries. At
the other end of the spectrum, the unique equilibrium has parties endogenously choosing to
hold primaries. Lastly, there is an intermediate region in which either only one party holds
primaries, or both hold them with some symmetric interior probability.
Proof. See Appendix 1.B.
Figure 1.1 summarizes the results from this section: first of all, the green line represents
the non-rejection condition. In other words, separating equilibria exist only in the region
north-west of the green line. The orange line, on the other hand, represents the indifference
line between not holding primaries and holding primaries when the other party is not
holding primaries. This means that to the right of the orange line, a no-primary equilibrium
exists. Finally, the purple line is the indifference condition between holding a primary and
not holding it whenever the other party is holding a primary. This means that a double
primary equilibrium is only sustainable to the left of this line. This means that between the
23It is in fact the case that in some countries, primaries have been held by only one of the major parties,
such as the the Partito Democratico in Italy.
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orange and the purple line, the only equilibria are either asymmetric primary-no primary
equilibria, or a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
Figure 1.1: Double Primary Equilibrium Characterization
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of signaling in primary elections, in which high quality candi-
dates use their positioning along the liberal-conservative axis to separate from low valence
ones. Therefore, radical campaign statements prior to a primary election might serve the
purpose of convincing voters that a candidate is valent. This means that primaries are po-
larizing not much because primary electors are more radical, but because politicians exploit
primaries to send voters signals about their valence. Under this mechanism, the presence
of primaries introduces a trade-off between quality of politicians and policy polarization.
This is a novel result which goes in the opposite direction to what has been found in
models where valence is observable at the time of the primary vote. In other words, my
model predicts that if valence is unobservable, primary winners (at least in a primary
selecting the candidate running against an incumbent, or a fully open seat primary) will
generally choose partisan platforms. Moreover, I also show that if parties can choose
whether to hold primaries, an equilibrium with primaries is not always sustainable, even if
parties are always better off when both hold primaries than when they both do not hold
them. In this context it is also possible that only one political side decides to hold primaries
in equilibrium, something of which there are several instances in Western Europe.
Future extensions research on this topic could investigate how the mechanism I describe
interacts with elements of primary elections that I currently exclude from the model, such
as the openness of primary elections, the potential conflict between party leadership and
party base and the possibility for politicians to flip-flop between the primary and the
general election.
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Appendix 1.A Observability of Valence Off-Equilibrium
To build the model presented in the paper I assumed that valence always gets revealed
before the general election. In this section I relax this assumption. Notice first of all that
the arising of a separating equilibrium makes the observability of valence superfluous along
the equilibrium path, whereas it plays an important role in the characterization of the
equilibrium. Relaxing the observability assumption (but keeping in place the commitment
to platforms), a separating equilibrium is still sustainable. However, it becomes more
difficult for valent politicians to prevent non-valent politicians from mimicking their actions.
The incentive compatibility constraint now is the following:(
2− α
2
){
z
[
1
2
+
1
4ǫ
(dH + r − 1)
]
+ (1− z)
[
1
2
+
1
4ǫ
(d+H + r + v − 1)
]}
≤
≤ 1− α
2
{
1
2
+
1
4ǫ
(dL + r − 1)
}
This can be rewritten as:
dH ≤ 1
2− α(1− 2ǫ− r) +
1− α
2− αdL − (1− z)v
As a result, separation requires valent politicians to move to the left by at least:
d˜zH =
1
2− αr˜ + (1− z)v
which is larger than the amount required in the observable valence case and is increasing
in v: this makes primaries less attractive compared to the z = 1 benchmark for both party
members and valent politicians. However, the intuition for the model remains unchanged.
Appendix 1.B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Let µj denote the probability that the Democratic candidate j is
valent given the information conveyed by the platform location chosen to participate in the
primary elections. If the primary conveyed no information (i.e. types pool), then µj = α
and the outcome would be the same as drawing a random candidate from the pool. At the
other extreme, µj = 1 indicates a case in which primaries perfectly reveal j’s valence. The
expected utility the party derives from a candidate locating at dj and who is believed to
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be valent with probability µj is:
EUD(dj , µj) = −r + µj
[
r˜ − d˜j + v
4ǫ
(r˜ + d˜j + v)
]
+ (1− µj)
[
r˜ − d˜j
4ǫ
(r˜ + d˜j)
]
In order to get the optimal location the party would choose ceteris paribus, all which is
left to do is differentiate with respect to dj , which rather straightforwardly yields:
d˜j = 0⇔ dj = 1
2
− ǫ ≡ d∗
Derivation of Condition 1. Separation is feasible only if the party is willing to accept
the new platform, which despite being closer to its bliss point, wins the general election
with a smaller probability. Using the expression for the probability of winning the general
election of a Democratic candidate, 12 +
1
4ǫ(d + r + v − 1), the probability of winning the
general election for a non valent candidate located at d∗ = 12 − ǫ can be expressed as r˜4ǫ ,
whereas that for a valent candidate located at dH = d
∗ − d˜H the probability is r˜−d˜+v4ǫ .
Comparing expected utilities for a party voter, the condition for a party voter to prefer
the valent politician who is signalling reads:
1
4ǫ
(r˜ − d˜H + v)(r˜ + d˜H + v)− r ≥ 1
4ǫ
r˜2
which can be rearranged to:
d¯H ≤
√
(v + r˜)2 − r˜2.
Now, substituting for d˜H =
1
2−α r˜, dividing by r˜
2 and solving the resulting quadratic
equation for ρ˜ we obtain the condition in the statement. Notice that if this condition does
not hold, there are two possibilities. If r˜2 >
√
(v + r˜)2 − r˜2, then the game has a pooling
equilibrium at d∗. Otherwise, pooling is not sustainable and no equilibrium (at least in
pure strategies) exists.
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that the screening party wants to implement a sepa-
rating equilibrium. Then it has to maximize the following expression:
(1−α)2
[
1
4ǫ
(2ǫ− 1 + dL + r)(r − dL)− r
]
+[1−(1−α)2]
{
1
4ǫ
(2ǫ− 1 + dH + r + v)(r − dH + v)
}
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subject to
dH =
1− α
2− αdL +
1
2− α(1− r − 2ǫ)
which becomes
(1− α)2
[
1
4ǫ
(2ǫ− 1 + dL + r)(r − dL)− r
]
+ [1− (1− α)2]×
×
{
1
4ǫ
(2ǫ− 1 + 1− α
2− αdL +
1
2− α(1− r − 2ǫ) + r + v)(r −
1− α
2− αdL −
1
2− α(1− r − 2ǫ) + v)
}
.
Differentiating with respect to dL and multiplying by the constant 4ǫ we obtain the fol-
lowing:
(1− α)2[r − dL − 2ǫ+ 1− r − dL] + [1− (1− α)2]1− α
2− α×
×
[
r + v − 1− α
2− αdL −
1
2− α(1− r − 2ǫ)−
(
2ǫ− 1 + 1− α
2− αdL +
1
2− α(1− r − 2ǫ) + r + v
)]
In order to find the maximum (notice that the second order condition is negative), equate
the derivative to zero and rearrange to obtain:
dscrL =
1
2
− ǫ+ α
2(1− α)
(
r −
(
1
2
− ǫ
))
> d∗
As one can see, the optimal screening policy for the low type is more moderate than that
resulting from the signalling model, which is d∗ = 12 − ǫ. Moreover, in order to conclude
whether it is optimal to separate types or not, notice that the utility the party derives from
playing a separating equilibrium is:
−r+ 1
4ǫ
[(2ǫ− 1 + r + dL)(r − dL)] (1−α)2+ 1
4ǫ
α(2−α) [(2ǫ− 1 + r + dH + v)(r − dH + v)]
whereas the utility arising from a pooling equilibrium is
−r + α
[
1
4ǫ
(r − 1
2
+ ǫ+ v)(r − 1
2
+ ǫ+ v)
]
+
1− α
4ǫ
[
(r − 1
2
+ ǫ)(r − 1
2
+ ǫ)
]
This reduces to the inequality:
α(2− α)v2 + 2α(2− α)r˜v − α(4− α)
4
r˜2 ≥ αv2 + 2αvr˜
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which finally leads to the condition
v
r˜
≡ ρ˜ ≥
√
1 +
4− α
4(4− α) − 1
under which screening is preferred to pooling.
Derivation of Condition 2. This condition determines the parameter values for which
a separating equilibrium is feasible, in the sense that the party voter prefers the separating
high valence candidate at dDPH (or r
DP
H ) to a low valence candidate at d
∗ (or r∗), when
having the choice. I consider an interim condition, meaning that when choosing the can-
didate, the party voter does not know the valence and location of the opponent yet. The
expected utility the party voter gets from a valent candidate at dDPH is the following:
U(dDPH , v) = α(2−α)
[
1
2
(2ǫ+ d˜DPH )−
1
2
d˜DPH + v
]
+(1−α)2
[(
1
2
− d˜
DP
H − v
4ǫ
)(
2ǫ+ d˜DPH + v
)]
−r∗
On the other hand, if the party voter chooses the non-valent candidate, her expected utility
is:
U(d∗, 0) = α(2−α)
[(
1
2
+
d˜DPH − v
4ǫ
)
2ǫ+
(
1
2
− d˜
DP
H − v
4ǫ
)
(v − d˜DPH )
]
+(1−α)2
[
1
2
2ǫ
]
−r∗
The former can be simplified to (I drop the exponent DP from the notation for the d
location):
U(dH , v) =
1
2
+ v − (1− α)2 d˜
2
H
4ǫ
+ (1− α)2 v
2
4ǫ
whereas the utility from the low valence candidate can be written as:
U(d∗, 0) = −1
2
+ α(2− α) d˜
2
H
4ǫ
+ α(2− α)v
2
4ǫ
− 2α(2− α)vd˜H
4ǫ
In order for separation to be feasible, it has to hold that U(dH , v) ≥ U(d∗, 0), which
requires:
v + [2(1− α)2 − 1]v
2
4ǫ
− d˜
2
H
4ǫ
+ 2α(2− α)vd˜H
4ǫ
≥ 0
Using the fact that d˜H =
2ǫ
(1−α)(2−α) − α1−αv one obtains the following expression in terms
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of ρ ≡ v2ǫ :[
2(1− α)2 − 1− α
2
(1− α)2 −
2α2(2− α)
1− α
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A(α)
ρ2 + 2
[
1 +
α
(2− α)(1− α)2 +
α
1− α
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B(α)
ρ+
− 1
(1− α)2(2− α)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
C(α)
≥ 0
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is in many aspects analogous to the one for the
single-primary game. In particular, the argument according to which non-valent politicians
locate at d∗ and 1−d∗ respectively is exactly the same as that in the single-primary game.
I will therefore focus here on the incentive compatibility constraint, i.e. the derivation of
the separating policy for the valent politician. The constraint for the D side of the game,
cancelling out 14ǫ , writes:(
1− α
2
) [
(1− α)2(2ǫ− 1 + dH + rL) + α(2− α)(2ǫ− 1 + dH + rH − v)
] ≤
≤ 1− α
2
[
(1− α)2(2ǫ− 1 + dL + rL) + α(2− α)(2ǫ− 1 + dL + rH − v)
]
.
One can also write a constraint for R:(
1− α
2
) [
(1− α)2(2ǫ+ 1− dL − rH) + α(2− α)(2ǫ+ 1− dH − rH − v)
] ≤
≤ 1− α
2
[
(1− α)2(2ǫ+ 1− dL − rL) + α(2− α)(2ǫ+ 1− dH − rL − v)
]
.
Letting the constraints hold with equality and substituting the second into the first yields
the following expression:
dH =
1 + α3 − 2α2
(2− α)(1− α)(1 + α)dL−
1
(2− α)(1 + α)rL+
1
(2− α)(1 + α)−
2ǫ
(2− α)(1− α)+
α
1− αv
However, notice that in any separating equilibrium, it has to be that dL =
1
2 − ǫ and
rL =
1
2 + ǫ. Substituting for these values in the expression above yields:
1
2
− ǫ− dH = 2ǫ
(2− α)(1− α) −
α
1− αv
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and noticing that by definition 12 − ǫ − dDPH = d˜DPH , one obtains the separating condition
stated in the theorem.
Proof of Proposition 4. Given that the characterization of equilibria involves rather
complicated expressions, I will derive the expected utility expressions and then plot them
to show the three different regions of equilibria in the (α, ρ) space. I begin by finding the
expected utility for each party (since the equilibrium is symmetric, expected utility is the
same for both parties) in the no-primary equilibrium and in the double primary equilib-
rium. U(P, P ) denotes the utility from the double-primary equilibrium and U(NP,NP ) the
utility from the no-primary equilibrium. The utilities are written in terms of the D party,
but given symmetry analogous expressions hold for the R party. Denote by r∗ ≡ 12 + ǫ:
U(NP,NP ) =− r∗ + α2
[
1
2
2ǫ+ v
]
+ (1− α)2
[
1
2
2ǫ+ v
]
+
+ α(1− α)
[(
1
2
+
v
4ǫ
)
(2ǫ+ v)
]
+ α(1− α)
[(
1
2
+
v
4ǫ
)
v +
(
1
2
− v
4ǫ
2ǫ
)]
Taking out ǫ and noting that −r∗ + ǫ = 12 this can simplified to yield: −12 + [α2 + 2α(1−
α)(12 +
v
4ǫ)] which can be further simplified to yield:
1
2
+ αv − 2α(1− α)v
2
4ǫ
Notice that this can also be seen as the following:
−1
2
+ [1− (1− α)2]v − 2α(1− α)
(
1
2
− v
4ǫ
)
v
which can be interpreted as the utility from the choice of a social planner located at 12
minus the loss in valence due to the random location of the median voter. It can be shown
that any symmetric equilibrium provides an expected utility of this form: however, for
the sake of completeness, I will nonetheless derive the expected utility from the primary
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equilibrium from scratch:
U(P, P ) =− r∗ + α2(2− α)2
[
1
2
(−d˜DPH ) +
1
2
(2ǫ+ d˜DPH ) + v
]
+ (1− α)4
[
1
2
2ǫ
]
+
+ α(2− α)(1− α)2
[(
1
2
+
d˜DPH − v
4ǫ
)
2ǫ+
(
1
2
− d˜
DP
H − v
4ǫ
)
(−d˜DPH + v)
]
+
+ (1− α)2α(2− α)
[(
1
2
− d˜
DP
H − v
4ǫ
)
(−d˜DPH + v)
]
This can be simplified to the following expression:
−1
2
+ [1− (1− α)4]v − 2α(2− α)(1− α)2
(
1
2
+
d˜DPH − v
4ǫ
)
v
and further to:
−1
2
+ [1− (1− α)4 − α(1− α)((1− α)(2− α) + 1)]v + [α(2− α)(1− α)]v
2
4ǫ
where I used the fact that d˜DPH =
2ǫ
(1−α)(2−α) − α1−αv. I now calculate the payoff from a
deviation out of the no-primary and double-primary equilibrium. The first reads:
U(P,NP ) =− r∗ + (1− α)3
(
1
2
2ǫ
)
+ α2(2− α)
[(
1
2
− d˜H
4ǫ
)
(2ǫ+ d˜H)
]
+
+ α(1− α)2
[(
1
2
+
v
4ǫ
)
v +
(
1
2
− v
4ǫ
)
2ǫ
]
+
+ α(2− α)(1− α)
[(
1
2
− d˜H − v
4ǫ
)
(2ǫ+ d˜H + v)
]
which can be simplified to:
−1
2
+ α(1− α)2 v
2
4ǫ
+ α2(2− α)
[
v − d˜
2
H
4ǫ
]
+ α(2− α)(1− α)
[
v +
v2
4ǫ
− d˜
2
H
4ǫ
]
and finally to:
−1
2
+ α
[
(2− α) + α
2
]
v + α
[
(1− α)(3− 2α)− α
2− α
]
v2
4ǫ
− α
2− αǫ
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Finally, the utility from a deviation out of the primary equilibrium can be written as:
U(NP,P ) =− r∗ + (1− α)3
[
1
2
2ǫ
]
+ α2(2− α)
[(
1
2
− d˜H
4ǫ
)
(−d˜H) +
(
1
2
+
d˜H
4ǫ
)
2ǫ+ v
]
+
+ α(1− α)2
[(
1
2
+
v
4ǫ
)
(2ǫ+ v)
]
+ α(1− α)(2− α)
[(
1
2
− d˜H − v
4ǫ
)
(d˜H + v) +
(
1
2
+
d˜H − v
4ǫ
)
2ǫ
]
This can be simplified to get:
−1
2
+α2(2−α)
[
d˜2H
4ǫ
+ v
]
+α(1−α)2
[
v
2
+
v
2
+
v2
4ǫ
]
+α(1−α)(2−α)
[
d˜2H
4ǫ
+
vd˜H
4ǫ
+
vd˜H
4ǫ
+
v2
4ǫ
]
which can further simplified to yield:[
α(1− α)(3− 2α)(1− α)2 + 2α2(2− α)(1− α)2 + 2α3(2− α)
(1− α)2
]
v2
4ǫ
− α
2
(1− α)2 v+
α
(1− α)2(2− α)
The next step involves the checking for the conditions under which a no-primary and a
primary equilibrium exist: a no-primary equilibrium exists if and only if U(NP,NP ) ≥
U(P,NP ); dividing both sides by 2ǫ and defining ρ ≡ v2ǫ one obtains:
αρ− α(1− α)ρ2 ≤ α
[
(2− α) + α
2
]
ρ+
α
2
[
(1− α)(3− 2α)− α
2− α
]
ρ2 − α
2(2− α)
which can be simplified to:
[(1− α)(2− α)(1− 2α)− α]ρ2 + (2− α)2ρ− 1 ≤ 0
From the solution of this quadratic equation it can be seen that a no-primary equilibrium
exists if and only if ρ is sufficiently small, with the threshold depending on α. In particular,
for α sufficiently large a no-primary equilibrium always exists. I will now move on to the
double-primary equilibrium. Dividing the expressions for U(P, P ) and U(NP,P ) by 2ǫ,
the condition U(P, P )− U(NP,P ) ≥ 0 can be rewritten as:
[
α(2− α)(1− α)− α(1− α)
3(3− 2α) + 2α2(1− α)2(2− α) + 2α3(2− α)
2(1− α)2
]
ρ2+
+
[
1− (1− α)4 − α(1− α)[(1− α)(2− α) + 1]− α
2
(1− α)2
]
ρ− α
2(2− α)(1− α)2 ≥ 0
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Solving this quadratic equation produces another threshold on ρ, depending on α, above
which a double-primary equilibrium is sustainable. A numerical exploration shows that this
threshold is, for any α ∈ [0, 1], higher than the one below which a no-primary equilibrium
is sustainable. This means that there exist values of ρ for which a symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium does not exist. In this interval, two types of equilibria are possible: a symmetric
equilibrium in mixed strategies (which I will not characterize) or asymmetric equilibria in
which one party holds the primary and the other party doesn’t.
32
2 Flip-flopping and Electoral Concerns
Politicians who change their mind on a policy issue are often confronted with the accusation
of being flip-floppers. However, a changing environment sometimes makes policy revisions
necessary. The present analysis suggests that flip-flopping on a policy issue is detrimental
to a politician’s reputation because it sends a bad signal on the accuracy of his information.
As a result, electorally concerned politicians can have the incentive to stick to a no longer
efficient policy choice in order to avoid the stigma of flip-flopping. This distorted behaviour
is not only damaging in terms of policy welfare, but also in terms of a worse selection
of competent politicians through elections. In this context, a single-term limit rule can
improve welfare, achieving undistorted policies, although at the cost of worsened politicians’
selection. At the same time, introducing some noise in voters’ observation of the policy
choice is always optimal, whereas providing voters with a signal about the state of the
world can lead to increased distortions. These results lend themselves to an interesting
interpretation in terms of ability of the media to discipline politicians.
But with Kerry the charge isn’t that he’s inconstant. It’s that in his inconstancy he flips
wrong – the far more serious charge of bad judgment.
Mickey Kaus (Slate)
Internal discussion and advice can only be withheld where disclosure of the information in
question would be harmful to the frankness and candour of future discussions.
Campaign for Freedom of Information, 1997
2.1 Introduction
Consistency is one of the qualities that voters value the most in a politician. As the
political scientist Fearon (1999) wrote: “If I think of elections as a problem of choosing
a competent, like-minded type not easily bought by special interests, then it makes perfect
sense to be highly concerned with principledness and consistency”. As a result, voters
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tend to dislike politicians who change their mind on a policy issue, which is disparagingly
denoted as flip-flopping 1. As a matter of fact, one of the most frequent attacks used in
electoral races is the allegation of being a flip-flopper. Two famous cases of presidential
candidates that have considerably suffered from being viewed as flip-floppers are John
Kerry and Mitt Romney. The fact that voters tend to punish politicians who flip-flop is
also to a large extent confirmed by survey evidence collected by political scientists2.
In a changing world in which politicians are constantly exposed to new information,
however, changing one’s mind on an issue is natural and actually the optimal thing to do
in many situations: as Keynes put it, “When the facts change, I change my mind”. In
this respect, the reputational stigma of flip-flopping can seem puzzling. In this paper I
show how flip-flopping can be detrimental to a politician’s reputation even in cases where
ideological or private-interest related concerns are absent, i.e. situations in which changing
one’s mind simply reflects a change in the information available to the politician. In
particular, flip-flopping is rationally punished by voters if i) the optimal policy choice is
persistent ii) politicians have private information which cannot be credibly revealed to the
public and iii) voters are not (fully) capable of judging the validity of a policy choice.
The reason for this penalization is that policy shifts are associated with poorly informed
politicians; therefore, voters trying to select well-informed (competent) politicians assign
a better reputation to politicians who do not flip-flop. There is indeed evidence of such a
rationale in political commentary: Jack Shafer of the media outlet Politico, for example,
wrote the following 3 referring to Hillary Clinton: “So if new or better information has
been the impetus for her policy shifts, she must concede that she has a fat history of taking
the wrong position in the early going and then requiring a re-do”.
If one part of the story has to do with how voters perceive policy shifts, the flip side of
it has to do with how the reputational stigma attached to flip-flopping affects politicians’
behaviour. Since flip-flopping is bad for a politician’s electoral prospects, a strongly office-
motivated politician will have the incentive to distort his behaviour in order to avoid flip-
flops: my model therefore describes a form of electoral pandering which is endogenously
induced by the previous action of the politician. In other words, politicians display an
excess of conservatism, or postured consistency, with respect to their previous decisions.
One historical example in which such a logic seems to have played an important role is the
1Use of this expression dates back to at least 1890 according to The New York Times archives. Other
terms used to shed negative light on the change of course of a politician are u-turn and backflip.
2See Tomz and Houweling (2012) and Doherty, Dowling, and Miller (2015): I will elaborate more about
these and other studies in the related literature section.
3The full article can be found at this link: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/10/
democratic-debate-hillary-clinton-flip-flop-213247
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decision to start the Iraq war: George Bush and Tony Blair believed Saddam Hussein had
(or was in the process of developping) weapons of mass destruction and that waging war
on Iraq was necessary to stop him. When evidence pointing in the opposite direction was
revealed (including intelligence reports and the work of UN inspectors), the two presidents
should have realized that the threat posed by Saddam was after all not so large and
reconsidered their plans to invade Iraq. However, they never performed this (beneficial)
flip-flop. The publication of the Chilcot report in the United Kingdom has recently provided
further evidence that Tony Blair’s decision to maintain his support for the Iraq invasion
was not in accordance with the information he had received from his intelligence sources.
As The Guardian put it: “That was the point at which the UK government could and should
have said the US must count the UK out. Blair should have admitted that this was a line
in the sand. But he didn’t call a halt”.
Another example can be found in the Greek bailout referendum held in July 2015.
The Greek prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, thought he could get the upper hand in the
negotiations with the Troika by holding a referendum on the bailout proposal Greece had
received: if creditors had interpreted the referendum as a threat to break away from Europe,
they might have agreed to give Greece better conditions in order for example to avoid panic
on the financial markets. After the referendum was called, however, it started becoming
clear that European institutions were not willing to make concessions: Greece was not
going to leave Europe, and Tsipras’ bluff was called. Cancelling the referendum would
then have been the optimal choice in order to foster new negotiations and a renewed
cooperation between Greece and the European authorities. Tsipras, however, decided to
proceed with the referendum, urging his supporters to vote against the (by then expired)
offer. Despite the victory of the no front, Greece had to agree to a new bailout under
conditions considered by many as punishing.
After establishing that reputational concerns lead to an insufficient amount of flip-
flopping, the second part of the paper discusses some institutional design approaches to
tackle the problem: the first-one is a single term limit policy. By forbidding the re-election
of incumbents, such a policy eliminates all policy distortions: as a matter of fact, in this
model electoral rents are the only source of misalignment between voters and politicians.
At the same time, however, the single term limit forces voters to forgo all the potential
gains of learning about a politician’s type from his track-record. Not least, such policies
require commitment, for example through constitutions.
The other institutional feature that I discuss is the media. The importance of the media
in informing citizens and evaluating policies goes without explanation, but how does that
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affect the issue of distorted consistency highlighted in my model? I focus my attention
on the two main roles played by the media: the reporting of politicians’ policy choices
(reporting media) and the evaluation of policy (commentator media).
Two results from the analysis of the media model stand out: first of all, fully accurate
reporting of policy choices is never optimal. A noisy media can insulate the politician from
the reputational stigma of flip-flopping: lies are thus crowded out by noise. Moreover,
the net effect of this substitution is such that the performance of elections in selecting
competent types improves. If the noise is too large, however, then the selection eventually
worsens (no learning is possible when the media is fully noisy).
The non-monotonic effects of the media reporting accuracy suggest that the significantly
simpler and broader access to politicians’ track records made possible by improvements
in technology and the rise of social media might have led to an increase in policy distor-
tions. This result is related to the idea that transparency can be damaging for political
accountability: adding a noisy reporting media to the model is in fact similar to relaxing
the assumption of full action transparency. This links the present paper to the study of
Prat (2005), among others. Looking at the quote from the CFOI (1997) found at the
beginning of this paper 4, which also features in the article by Prat, we can see a nuance
that my model seems to be particularly apt at highlighting: that is the dynamic aspect
of the distortion caused by the disclosure of actions, which, the document maintains, can
affect future actions.
As far as the commentator media is concerned, the analysis delivers one particularly
counterintuitive result. Making the commentator better informed does not guarantee a
decrease in the flip-flop avoidance distortion. If i) persistence is high ii) incompetent
types have a sufficiently informative signal and iii) most politicians are competent, then
increasing the level of informativeness of the commentator media can actually increase the
extent to which incompetent politicians posture by avoiding flip-flops. The reason is that in
those circumstances, increasing the informativeness of media commentary can substantially
increase the gains from posturing and receiving an endorsement from the media; in other
words, faking consistency with more informative media is a riskier lottery, but it has a
larger upside, which can lead politicians to increase the distortion of their policy choices.
The main takeaway is that the returns to having more accurate media might be low if
not even negative. This could have relevant implications, for example with respect to the
public subsidization of media outlets.
4The quote reads: Internal discussion and advice can only be withheld where disclosure of the information
in question would be harmful to the frankness and candour of future discussions.
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2.2 Related Literature
This paper is related to several streams of literature. The electoral concerns model that I
consider builds on Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts (2001), Prat (2005) and Ashworth and
Shotts (2010). Besides some differences in how the model is built, of secondary importance
for the results, the main novelty of my model is to introduce an additional period in which
the incumbent takes an action. This feature is central for the contribution of the paper,
since it allows me to delve into the intrinsically dynamic nature of flip-flopping. Moreover,
by adding a stage-zero to an electoral concerns model, my analysis also allows for a simple
endogenous interpretation of the concept of pandering towards a popular action described
in electoral concerns models. In my model, as a matter of fact, the popular action is
simply the previous policy choice. In this sense, my work contributes to the political
economy literature on conformity (sometimes also denoted as pandering or herding): along
with the aforementioned Prat (2005), one of the seminal contributions is by Maskin and
Tirole (2004) - who compare the welfare properties of representative democracy, direct
democracy and judicial power; Levy (2007) considers a committee of career concerned
decision makers and Frisell (2009) shows that voters’ beliefs about the politician can have
self-fulfilling consequences. Levy (2004), on the other hand, shows that in a similar setting
also anti-herding (anti-conformism) can take place.
Connected to the idea of pandering towards a popular action is that of status-quo bias and
propensity to reform: examples of models with endogenously status-quo biased politicians
include Fu and Li (2014), where career-concerned policy makers undertake reform with
lower than optimal probability, and Dewan and Hortala-Vallve (2014), in whose model
voters learn through either the success of a reform or the information provided by a rival
candidate. My work, therefore, links the concepts of pandering and status quo-bias: the
past actions of the politician influence the voters’ beliefs to which the politician has an
incentive to conform.
As far as the discussion on media is concerned, Prat (2005) and Ashworth and Shotts
(2010) are the closest references. The introduction of a commentator media sector in the
model draws mostly on Ashworth and Shotts (2010): my contribution lies in the characteri-
zation of partially truthful equilibria (not just finding conditions for a truthful equilibrium)
and in the comparative statics analysis which shows how increasing the accuracy of the
commentator media need not decrease the distortion of politicians’ behaviour. These com-
parative statics also innovates with respect to the paper of Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006):
in their paper, the decision maker is a media outlet, which panders towards the prior belief
of citizens in order to form a reputation of accuracy. Whereas Gentzkow and Shapiro show
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that the more likely it is for voters to learn the true state of the world, the lower the
pandering by the media, I show that introducing an informative media might actually lead
politicians to act in a more distorted way.
The analysis of the reporting media, on the other hand, is related to the discussion of
action versus consequence transparency in Prat (2005). Since for many policy choices the
assumption of action secrecy is not a realistic alternative, I show that the accuracy of the
reporting media plays a similar role, and I demonstrate that the optimal arrangement is
to have some but not perfect information on the action taken by the politician.
The single term limit rule I mention in the institutional design section, on the other
hand, is related to the comparison between representative democracy and judicial power
carried out by Maskin and Tirole (2004). A single term limit rule has similar effects to
those of delegating decision making to a judicial power not subject to elections.
The consequences of reputation concerns on expert behaviour have also been studied
outside the electoral environment. In particular, repeated action by experts has been
analyzed by Prendergast and Stole (1996), Li (2007) and in a recent paper by Aghion
and Jackson (2016): in addition to many differences in the modelling strategy, the main
conceptual difference between my analysis and that of Prendergast and Stole has to do
with the fact that I consider a changing environment rather than a fixed state. Aghion and
Jackson, on the other hand, consider repeated action over a sequence of independent and
identically distributed states (whereas I allow for correlation) and with action consequences
being observable to the principal (whereas they are unobservable in my baseline model).
The defining feature of Li’s paper is to assume that decision makers’ information becomes
more accurate in the second period. In her model, a (fully reputation motivated) agent
has to do make two reports before being evaluated by the principal. The state of the
world is fixed and observable before the evaluation takes place, but the agent can be paid
a wage that only depends on beliefs about her ability. In such a setup it is possible for
agents to improve their reputation by changing their mind, unlike in my model. In other
situations, the premium for consistency leads low competence agents to gamble on being
proved consistently right, similarly to what happens in my model with the commentator
media. The idea of gambling on a policy likely to be proved wrong is also at the heart of the
paper by Majumdar and Mukand (2004): theirs is a model of experimentation, in which an
incumbent can choose to implement a risky policy and has to decide whether to continue
the project after a potentially unsuccessful trial. In their model, low type governments
are inefficiently reluctant to abandon bad projects, gambling on the small probability of
success that would boost their reputation.
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Another paper which shares part of the mechanism with my work is Patacconi and
Vikander (2015), in which a policy maker receives two signals from an agency and a conflict
between voters and policy-maker can arise when the signals are mixed, similarly to what
happens in my model after a mixed history of signals. However, whereas in their study
voters protest to get an unbiased policy enforced, in the environment I describe there are
no protests but elections to select the most competent candidate.
Since my paper explains the reputational stigma of flip-flopping, it is also worth men-
tioning some political economy works on this topic. Whereas my paper is the first, to
the best of my knowledge, to provide a theory of flip-flopping by a politician taking re-
peated decisions over an issue, there exists some theoretical work by Agranov (2016) and
Hummel (2010) dealing with flip-flops between primary and general elections, hence with
a completely different objective than that of my analysis.
On the empirical side, finally, there are several papers assessing how voters react to
politicians flip-flopping. Doherty, Dowling, and Miller (2015), for example, find that flip-
flopping affects the perception voters have of a politician. They show that voters are more
forgiving of flip-flops on complex issues or issues which are far away in time. These pre-
dictions are consistent with my model, in which flip-flops are a bad signal the higher the
state persistence (and we can think that persistence is lower over long periods) and the
worse is the signal that voters have. In the same paper, the authors also show that the
reputational cost of a flip-flop is compensated by the fact that the new position taken by
the politician will be seen favourably by some voters, creating a trade-off for the politi-
cian. Similarly, Tomz and Van Houweling (2012) conduct survey experiments showing that
candidates repositioning affects their support not only in terms of commitment to an ide-
ological issue, but also in terms of perceived valence. The valence aspect is important in
particular for issues that are not too salient for voters.
Another issue that has been studied is whether the effects of a flip-flop differ between
issues of principle (as abortion or gay marriage) versus pragmatic issues related to a specific
policy. Tavits (2007) shows that flip-flopping on pragmatic issues is seen less badly than
flip-flopping on ideological issues. On the other hand, Tomz and Houweling (2012) do
not find any difference among issues: independent of the issue, candidates who reposition
perform worse. In my model there is no difference between types of issues: I assume that
one decision is correct depending on the state of the world and that citizens would all agree
if perfectly informed. Tomz and Houweling (2012) also argue that the bad perception of
flip-flopping will deter candidates away from it: this is exactly what I happens in the formal
model I present, where flip-flopping is not bad per se, but politicians avoid it because it
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carries a bad signal for their reputations.
Levendusky and Horowitz (2012) show experimentally that in the context of international
relations, leaders who make threats and subsequently back down pay a cost in terms of
electoral support and reputation (which in the international relations literature is called
audience cost): one of the main reasons for this effect is that a leader changing his mind
is seen as less competent than one who stays coherent. What is more, they show that
partisanship does not play a significant role in the determination of audience costs. This
evidence seems to capture a mechanism lying very close to the one I present in my model.
As a matter of fact, given the presence of asymmetric information between politicians and
voters and the fact that politicians are often evaluated for their foreign policy conduct
before the consequences of their actions are fully known, foreign policy issues are among
those where the theory I develop should have more bite.
2.3 The Model
There is an incumbent politician, a set of identical voters and two periods t ∈ {1, 2}.
The politician’s job is to take an action at ∈ {0, 1} in each period. The action’s payoff
depends on the underlying state of the world, which can take two values ω ∈ {0, 1}. The
initial probability of each state is equal to p1 =
1
2 ; moreover, the state is persistent so that
for j ∈ {0, 1}, Pr(ω2 = j|ω1 = j) = γ > 12 . The utility for taking the right action is
normalized to 1 and it applies to both voters and politicians. At the beginning of period
one, an incumbent is randomly drawn. Incumbents can be of two types: competent and
incompetent. In each period, both types receive an informative signal st ∈ {0, 1} on the
state of the world, but the accuracy of the signal, Pr(st = j|ωt = j) = qθ depends on
the politician’s type θ ∈ {H,L}: 12 < qL < qH ≤ 1. To simplify exposition I fix qH = 1
(competent politicians perfectly observe the state) and therefore I drop the subscript from
qL, which will be simply denoted by q. Notice that since the initial prior is
1
2 , for all
γ < 1 the signal received by any politician is always decision-relevant. A signal is decision-
relevant when the probability of matching the action to the state is maximized by at = st.
I denote by ρt = Pr(ωt = st|st, θ, st−1) the posterior probability that the state is equal
to the signal after observing realization st. Since the posterior of the perfectly informed
competent politician is always equal to 1, ρ will denote, when not further specified, the
posterior of the incompetent politician. In particular, ρ2 will be used as short form for
ρ2(ω2 = s2|s1, s2 6= s1, θ = L), whereas ρ¯2 will indicate ρ2(ω2 = s2|s1, s2 = s1, θ = L).
Politicians know their competence, and the signals they receive are private information:
competent politicians represent a fraction λ of incumbents. At the end of period t = 2 there
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is an election, in which the representative voter decides whether to retain (r) or fire (f) the
incumbent politician (denote the decision e ∈ {r, f}). Voters know the statistical process
governing the economy and they observe the track-record of the incumbent politician,
i.e. the actions taken over the two periods, denoted by τ = (a1, a2). Track-records are
used to form beliefs µ(a1, a2) = Pr(θ = H|a1, a2) over a politician’s competence, which I
call reputation. Before the election takes place, a challenger appears. The challenger is
competent with probability λO. Moreover, as I will describe shortly, a draw from a uniform
distribution in v ∈ [−b, b], observed before the election takes place and independent of the
competence of incumbent and challenger, determines the relative valence of the challenger
versus the incumbent. The representative voter’s utility depends on whether the politician’s
action matches the state of the world (plus the valence draw in case the challenger is
elected); moreover, electing a competent politician gives voters a utility of b (denote by θe
the type of the election winner). Hence, Uc =
∑2
t=1 1at=ωt + 1e=fz + 1θe=Hb. Politicians
derive utility both from taking the right action while in office and winning the election, with
φ
2 denoting the additional utility received if re-elected. Formally: Up =
∑2
t=1 1at=ωt+1e=r
φ
2 .
As far as players’ strategies are concerned, I’ll start with politicians. A politician’s
information set, or history, denoted by ht, includes all actions up to t− 1 and signals up to
t. The strategy of the incumbent is a mapping Ψ from any history ht to any probability
distribution of actions at ∈ {0, 1}. In particular, since signals are decision-relevant, it is
useful to express the incumbent’s strategy as the probability σ(st) of choosing a policy at
in accordance to the realization at time t of the signal, denoted by st.
As far as the voter’s strategy is concerned, it implies retaining or firing the politician
in the election at the end of t = 2. The voter’s decision is e ∈ {r, f} and it depends on
the incumbent’s track record τ = (a1, a2). Voters choose each politician with probability
1
2 when indifferent
5.
The equilibrium concept I use is Perfect Bayesian (PBE), but I do not consider pooling
equilibria where at each time t, both types play the same action with probability 1. These
equilibria are ruled out by a simple trembling-hand perfection refinement 6.
5Notice, however, that this is a zero probability event, since challengers are distributed according to an
atomless distribution.
6For an example and the explanation of how the trembling-hand refinement eliminates these equilibria,
refer to the Appendix.
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2.4 Results
I start the analysis from the election in which the voter chooses between the incumbent
and the challenger. Just before the election, the valence draw v is realized. As a result,
voting for the challenger gives the voter a utility of v + λOb. Voting for the incumbent
gives instead the voter a utility of µ(a1, a2)b. Therefore, the incumbent is re-elected if
v ≤ (µ(a1, a2)−λO)b, and Pr(v ≤ (µ(a1, a2)−λO)b) = (µ(a1,a2)−λO)b−(−b)2b = 12+ µ(a1,a2)−λO2 .
In other words, the re-election probability is linearly increasing in reputation.
Having described the election stage, go back one step and consider the decisions of the
incumbent in periods t = 1 and t = 2. Signals are always decision-relevant, so maximizing
the probability to match the action to the state requires that politicians follow their signals.
If that happens in equilibrium, then I call the equilibrium truthful.
Definition 1. An equilibrium is truthful if and only if σ(st) = 1 for each st at any t and
for each type θ.
Let’s start with a simple observation about the reputation of different track records
under truthful play, which I will denote by µT (a1, a2) in order to stress the fact that
at = st. There are four possible track records, τ ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}. Given the
symmetric initial prior, however, the probability of obtaining each of the two consistent
and flip-flopping signal sequence is the same, and therefore, as the next claim will prove,
µT (0, 0) = µT (1, 1) and µT (0, 1) = µT (1, 0). In other words, all that matters is whether the
politician played the same action over the two periods or changed his mind. In particular,
I will call the former consistent track-records and the latter flip-flopping track-records, and
indicate them as τ = C and τ = F . I will therefore indicate with µTC and µ
T
F consistent
and flip-flopping track-records under truthful play.
Fact 1. Under truthful play, the reputation of a consistent track-record is strictly larger
than that of a flip-flopping track-record: µTC > µ
T
F .
Proof. Take any flip-flopping track record. Under truthful play, at = st, so that Pr(a2, a1|θ) =
Pr(s2, s1|θ). Denote by A(qθ)2 the probability that a politician receives a flip-flopping se-
quence of signals:
A(qθ)
2
=
1− γ
2
(q2θ + (1− qθ)2) +
γ
2
2qθ(1− qθ).
First notice that since p1 =
1
2 , the above expression holds for both types of flip-flopping
sequences of signals (0, 1) and (1, 0). It can be noted that A(qθ)2 =
1−γ
2 +
2γ−1
2 2qθ(1 − qθ)
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and since γ > 12 , 2γ − 1 > 0 and A(q) is decreasing in q. Hence, A(1) = 1 − γ < A(q).
Finally, let’s construct the reputations from the 4 possible track-records. Since A(q)2 only
depends on whether the politician received a consistent or flip-flopping sequence of signals,
there are only two possible levels of reputation: one from flip-flopping and one from being
consistent. To see that reputation from flip-flopping is lower than from consistent play
consider the following inequality:
µTF =
λA(1)
λA(1) + (1− λ)A(q) <
λ(1−A(1))
λ(1−A(1)) + (1− λ)(1−A(q)) = µ
T
C
From now on, I will simply write 1− γ for A(1) and denote by A ≡ A(q).
The result I just stated is very important for the development of the whole paper since
it highlights the reason that leads incumbents to distort their actions: the bad reputation
associated with flip-flopping. The stigma of flip-flopping, as a matter of fact, puts an
office motivated incumbent in front of a trade off. Whenever receiving a second signal
that contradicts the first one, i.e. s2 6= s1, a politician knows that doing the right thing for
society will get him a worse reputation. If the flip-flopping stigma is large enough compared
to the benefit from following his signal, the politician will choose to act contradicting his
information.
In light of this, it can be shown that a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of a truthful equilibrium is that incumbents have the incentive to follow their signals after
receiving a non-constant stream of signals. Moreover, a single crossing property makes it
sufficient to simply look at the incentives of incompetent incumbents. The reason is that
whereas both competent and incompetent politicians enjoy the same benefit from avoiding
a flip-flop, they do not sustain the same costs: having a less accurate signal, as a matter
of fact, means having a larger probability of matching the state of the world when playing
at 6= st. Lying is therefore cheaper for incompetent politicians. This property is very useful
for the characterization of the equilibrium.
Fact 2 (Single Crossing Property). The cost of acting against one’s signal is ρt(θ) −
(1− ρt(θ)) = 2ρt(θ)− 1, and since ρt(θ = L) < ρt(θ = H) = 1, contradicting the signal is
more costly for the competent politician.
It follows that a truthful equilibrium is only sustainable as long as incompetent politicians
are willing to follow their signal at t = 2 after receiving a stream of non-constant signals.
This in turn requires the office motivation parameter to be low enough, because as φ grows
larger, the benefits from holding office progressively dwarf the utility from matching the
action to the state of the world.
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Proposition 1. A truthful equilibrium is sustainable as long as φ ≤ φ¯, where
φ¯ =
2ρ2 − 1
µTC − µTF
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.
The parameter φ¯ is therefore the upper-bound on electoral rents7 under which a truthful
equilibrium is sustainable. The question now is: what happens when φ is larger than φ¯?
Moreover, does the game allow for a unique equilibrium? The answer to these questions is
given by the following theorem:
Theorem 1. The game always has a unique non-pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
For φ ≤ φ¯, the unique equilibrium is the truthful equilibrium. For φ > φ¯, the unique
equilibrium is partially truthful, meaning that:
σ(s1) = σ(s2|θ = H) = σ(s2 = a1|θ = L) = 1 and σ(s2 6= a1|θ = L) = σ∗ < 1.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.
This theorem proves that the game always has a unique non-pooling equilibrium. It
must therefore be the case that when φ ≤ φ¯, the unique equilibrium is truthful. When
φ > φ¯, on the other hand, the unique equilibrium is only partially truthful, since whenever
the signal received by politicians in the second period suggests flip-flopping, incompetent
politicians mix between following their signal and pandering towards their previous action.
Theorem 1 has two interesting implications: the first is that for any level of φ, flip-
flopping always decreases the incumbent’s reputation (since the two reputations average
at λ, a bad reputation is always below λ). However, the larger the flip-flopping avoidance
distortion caused by incompetent politicians not following their signal, the smaller is the
reputation gap between consistent play and flip-flopping, i.e. the less bad is the reputation
from flip-flopping. As φ tends to infinity and politicians only care about re-election, the
reputation gap between consistency and flip-flopping approaches zero.
The second (and related) implication is that when the equilibrium is partially truthful,
there is an insufficient amount of flip-flopping compared to the truthful equilibrium. In
other words, voters stigmatize flip-flopping but at the same time they would be better off
if more flip-flopping took place. As a matter of fact, it could even happen that voters are
more confident about the policy being correct after seeing a flip-flop rather than consistent
policy: a flip-flop sends a bad signal on the incumbent’s type but is always earnest, whereas
7The actual rents for the politician are φ
2
, but that only serves the purpose of simplifying calculations and
has no other consequence on the model.
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a consistent policy is a good sign on the politician’s type but not necessarily earnest. I
summarize these insights in the following corollary:
In equilibrium, flip-flopping gives a bad reputation compared to truthful play: µ∗C−µ∗F >
0 for any φ. Equivalently, µ∗C > λ > µ
∗
F . In a partially truthful equilibrium, there is
insufficient flip-flopping compared to the truthful equilibrium.
Notice that another interesting implication of the model is that change hurts incumbents:
when the state of the world changes, the reputation of incumbents is likely to fall (because
of flip-flopping) and this means the incumbent is more likely to get replaced. At the same
time, this also means that conditional on a change in leader, leaders who rise to power after
a change in the state are worse than those who get in office after a period of stability. On
the other hand, conditional on having a bad leader in office, a change in state increases the
chances of having a better leader in the following period. In other words, improvements in
leadership are more likely after a change in the state of the world.
Fact 3. A leadership change is more likely after the state of the world changed. Conditional
on a leadership change, leaders who rise to power after a change in the state of the world
are worse; however, a change in the state of the world increases the chance of having a
better leader in the following period.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.
2.4.1 Comparative Statics and Welfare
First of all, the definition of welfare in this model is based on the expected utility of voters,
calculated as of time t = 0 (i.e. before randomly picking the incumbent); as such, welfare
does not account for the utility of politicians 8.
Definition 2. Social welfare W is defined as:
W = E0
[
2∑
t=1
1at=ωt
]
+ E0[v|e = f ] + 1θe=Hb
Welfare can be decomposed in two parts, accountability and selection. Accountability
indicates whether the incumbent acts in the best possible manner for society, which in this
case means to follow the signal: accountability welfare is therefore the probability that
the incumbent chooses the optimal policy, formally
∑2
t=1 1at=ωt . Selection-welfare, on the
8This is standard in political economy, as we consider politicians too small a fraction of the population
for their welfare to matter in the aggregate.
45
other hand, indicates the utility the voter derives from the election winner, also accounting
for the valence shock: formally 1θe=Hb+ 1e=fv.
Let’s denote by d ≡ λ − λO and by q˜ = q − A(1 − σ∗)(2ρ2 − 1) the accuracy of the
incompetent’s politician policy choice, taking into account that not following the signal
changes its accuracy across the two states of the world. The expression for welfare can be
rewritten in the following way:
W = [λ+ (1− λ)q] + [λ+ (1− λ)q˜] + b
[
1
4
+
λ2O
4
− λλO
2
+
λ+ λO
2
+
Eµ2
4
]
(2.1)
Proof. As far as t = 1 and t = 2 are concerned, since the competent politician follows his
signal, which is perfectly accurate, he always takes the right decision. The incompetent
politician, instead, follows the signal in the first period, taking the right decision with
probability q, but in the second period, if the signal indicates flip-flopping as the optimal
action, he contradicts it with probability 1−σ∗. As a result, the accuracy of the incompetent
incumbent’s signal is (1−A)ρ¯2 +A(σ∗ρ2 + (1− σ∗)(1− ρ2)) = q − (1− σ∗)(2ρ2 − 1)A, to
get which I used the fact that (1−A)ρ¯2 +Aρ2 = q, since q = Pr(ω = s1|s1). As far as the
valence draw is concerned, the expression for expected welfare is the following:
E[v|e = f ] = ∑τ∈{C,F} Pr(τ)Pr(e = f |τ)E[v|v b(µτ − λO)]. Now, E[v|v b(µ − λO)] =
b
2 [1 + (µF − λ0)] and Pr(e = f |µ) = 12 − µF−λ02 . So E[v|e = f ] = Eµ b4 [1 − (µ − λO)2] =
Eµ
b
4 [1 − d2]. Finally, Pr(e = f) = Eµ
[
1
2 − µ−λO2
]
whereas Pr(e = r|θ = H) = 12 −
λO
2 +
Pr(τ=C|H)µC+Pr(τ=F |H)µF
2 , where Pr(τ = C|H) = γ and Pr(τ = F |H) = 1 − γ.
Taking expectations with respect to µ where necessary, and considering that Eµ = Pr(τ =
C)µC + Pr(τ = F )µF = λ, the welfare expression can be rewritten as W=[λ+ (1− λ)q] +
[λ+(1−λ)q˜]+ b4 [1−Eµ(µ−λO)2]+ bλO
(
1
2 − λ−λO2
)
+bλ
[
1
2 − λO2 + γµC+(1−γ)µF2
]
. Consider now
the expression Eµµ
2, where the expectation is taken over the distribution of µ:
Eµ2 = Pr(τ = C)µ2C + Pr(τ = F )µ
2
F
Using the fact that Pr(τ = C) = λγµC and Pr(τ = F ) =
λ(1−γ)
µF
I can rewrite the former
expression to get:
Eµ2 = λ(γµC + (1− γ)µF ).
This is very useful to simplify the result since we can see that the last term is in fact equal
to: b2Eµ
2. Doing this substitution and multiplying out all the terms, the welfare expression
can finally be expressed as (2.1).
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Since from the analysis of the equilibrium I get a condition on µC − µF , however, it is
useful to know whether the gap between the good reputation from consistent play and the
bad reputation from flip-flopping is sufficient to conclude something on selection welfare.
The following lemma tackles this question:
Lemma 1. Selection welfare increases when µC and the reputation gap µC − µF increase.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.
Lemma 1 will be helpful to prove some of the welfare results, since it tells us that
whenever the reputation gap gets larger, knowing that the reputation from consistent play
increased is enough to tell that selection welfare increased. As a result, let’s now move on
to stating how variations in the model parameters affect welfare.
Fact 4. Increasing φ weakly decreases welfare.
Proof. When φ increases, the benefits from office increase and this increases the account-
ability distortion. This happens because µC − µF is an increasing function of σ; when
φ increases, therefore, σ∗ decreases up to the point where µC − µF is equal to the new
costs of deviating for the signal. This reasoning can be easily verified from the equilibrium
condition, noting that the right-hand side increases as σ∗ increases:
2ρ2 − 1φ = λγ
λγ + (1− λ)(1−Aσ∗) −
λ(1− γ)
λ(1− γ) + (1− λ)Aσ∗
The decrease in σ∗ negatively impacts welfare in the second period. In terms of selection
of politicians, since a lower σ∗ decreases µC and increases µF , then from Lemma 1 we
know that this means that the second moment will decrease, hence also selection welfare
worsens.
It has to be kept in mind, of course, that this model abstracts from all those reasons
why it might be a good idea to offer electoral incentives to politicians (for example to
improve the share of competent politicians in the pool); as a matter of fact, in this model
politicians’ interests are aligned with those of citizens except for electoral incentives.
Another conclusion from the analysis is that having a wide competence gap between the
two politicians’ types is bad for accountability: as a result, increasing q always increases
welfare, both because politicians pander less (i.e. σ∗ increases) and because incompetent
politicians have better information when they choose a policy.
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Fact 5. As long as σ∗ < 1, increasing q strictly increases welfare.
Proof. Assume that q increases to q′. An increase in q moves A = (1− γ)(q2 + (1− q)2) +
2γq(1 − q) down and 2ρ2−1φ up. As long as both σ∗(q) and σ∗(q′) are strictly less than 1,
then in equilibrium 2ρ2−1φ = µC − µF and therefore an increase of q to q′ leads to a larger
equilibrium value of µC − µF . Moreover, since a decrease in A lowers µC and raises µF
ceteris paribus, σ∗ has to increase in order to make µC − µF larger. In particular, it has
to be the case that Aσ∗ increases. It follows that µC(q′) > µC(q), and as a result from
Lemma 1 we know that selection welfare improves. In terms of accountability welfare,
σ∗(q′) > σ∗(q) and q′ > q, so not only incompetent politicians are better, but they also act
in a less distorted way. Hence, accountability welfare and therefore total welfare increases.
Notice that once in a truthful equilibrium, an increase in q decreases µC−µF , since A keeps
decreasing but σ cannot increase any further. As a result, the second moment decreases
and the probability of having a competent politician in office in the second period decreases.
However, bad politicians are better so the effect on selection welfare is ambiguous.
Notice that when q is high, i.e. politicians are in general competent, then µF is lower,
i.e. flip-flopping hurts more. This might be one of the reasons why flip-flopping can hurt
candidates in a race such as the US presidential election, despite the fact that electoral
incentives are high. In other words, flip-flopping is worse for a candidate’s reputation with
more homogeneity between competent and incompetent candidates 9.
When λ increases, both µC and µF increase. However, µC − µF can either increase
or decrease. As a result, σ∗ can also move in either direction. This means that there
exist cases in which having a better pool of politicians increases the distortion generated
by incompetent politicians avoiding flip-flops. In terms of welfare from the selection of
politicians, however, an increase in λ is always beneficial, at least whenever the starting
point is a partially truthful equilibrium. The reason is that the equilibrium level of µC−µF
remains constant. This means that both µC and µF increase, and from Lemma 1 we know
that this means the selection of politicians improves.
Fact 6. Increasing λ in a partially truthful equilibrium improves selection welfare, but it
can either increase or decrease accountability welfare.
Proof. Assume that the game has a partially truthful equilibrium. The change in λ will
therefore lead to either a truthful equilibrium or the game will remain in a partially truthful
9Notice that a bad reputation in this setup is just the probability of being of the incompetent type, no
matter how bad the incompetence is.
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equilibrium. In the first scenario, by definition the policy distortion decreases, because σ∗
increases to 1. Moreover, given that Eµ and since in a truthful equilibrium (compared
to a partially truthful one) µC − µF is larger, then welfare improves, given that also µC
increases for sure, given that Eµ has to increase.
Let’s now consider the case in which the game remains in a partially truthful equilibrium.
Accountability welfare can either increase or decrease. The reason is that, denoting by
DC ≡ λγ + (1− λ)(1− Aσ) and DF = λ(1− γ) + (1− λ)Aσ, the expression ∂(µC−µF ))∂λ =
Aσ∗
1−γ
1
D2F
− 1−Aσ∗γ 1D2C can move in both directions following an increase in λ. As a consequence,
σ∗ can either increase or decrease in order to move µC − µF back to the equilibrium
level. In other words, despite more competent politicians being there, it is possible for
the increasingly distortive behaviour of incompetent politicians to decrease accountability
welfare.
In terms of selection welfare, on the other hand, the average µ increases despite µC −µF
remaining constant. This means that either µC and µF increase, or that at least Pr(τ = C)
has to increase. However, we can check using Pr(τ = C) = λγµC that µC has to increase,
because otherwise both Pr(τ = C) and Pr(τ = F ) would increase, which is a contradiction.
It follows by Lemma 1 that selection welfare increases.
Things get more complicated when evaluating a change in the persistence parameter
γ. With more persistence there are several possible cases: first of all, σ∗ can be either
increasing or decreasing in γ. In the former case, accountability improves with higher
persistence, whereas in the latter it could go either way. In terms of selection, however,
it can be shown that a more persistent state of the world decreases the effectiveness of
elections in selecting competent politicians:
Fact 7. The probability of selecting a competent politician through elections decreases as
γ increases.
Proof. When γ increases, the equilibrium value of µC − µF decreases. From Lemma 1,
we know that in such a situation selection only improves when both µC and µF increase.
However, since it has to be that Pr(τ = C)µC + Pr(τ = F )µF = λ, then if both µC and
µF were to increase, Pr(τ = F ) would have to increase, too. However, this is not possible,
because if γ increases and Pr(τ = F ) also increases, then µF decreases. This means that
selection always worsens when γ increases.
This result is interesting since it tells us that elections perform worse in a less variable
world. This can seem surprising, especially given that conditional on a leadership change,
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elected leaders are worse after a change in the state. However, the result is driven by
the fact that whenever a bad leader is in office, a change in state increases the chances of
having a competent one after the election.
Lastly, although I do not include politicians in the calculation of social welfare, it is
nonetheless important to understand whether they are made better or worse off by their
strategic behaviour.
Fact 8. Incompetent politicians can be worse off in a partially truthful equilibrium in which
they distort their actions compared to the truthful benchmark.
Proof. Writing the utility of incompetent politicians under the two scenarios and using the
envelope theorem we get to the following expression to evaluate:
(1−A)
[
λγ
λγ + (1− λ)(1−A) −
λγ
λγ + (1− λ)(1−Aσ∗)
]
+
−A
[
λ(1− γ)
λ(1− γ) + (1− λ)Aσ∗ −
λ(1− γ)
λ(1− γ) + (1− λ)A
]
Since the result can go in both directions, it is enough to provide two examples. First of all,
let’s consider the case in which incompetent politicians are better off under the equilibrium
with distortions. This just requires a small enough γ: it can be checked numerically that if
γ is sufficiently low, then for any σ∗ ∈ [0, 1), as well as λ and q, the expression is negative.
In order to show that it is possible for the expression to be positive, check numerically that
for sufficiently large γ and sufficiently low q and λ there is an interval σ ∈ [s, 1) in which the
expression is strictly positive. Then take φ such that a truthful equilibrium is sustainable
and increase it: since σ∗ is continuous in φ, then for any σˆ in an ǫ-interval around 1 there
exists a φˆ such that σ∗(φˆ) = σˆ. Since we know that the expression is positive at σˆ, then
there necessarily exist values of γ, q and λ such that the incompetent incumbent would be
better off if he were able to commit to not distorting his actions.
Another way to describe this result is that an institution forbidding incumbents to distort
their actions (which would always benefit society as a whole) would also be supported by
incompetent politicians when they make up a large enough share of the political class,
their information is very bad and the world is more stable. This last part is particularly
interesting, since it might suggest that such a reform could be easier to achieve when the
environment is more stable.
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2.5 Institutional Design
So far I have shown how the bad reputation from flip-flopping can give (incompetent)
politicians an incentive to distort their actions. In the baseline model I have presented,
there are three fundamental ingredients leading to the result: the first is the fact that
politicians face an election at the end of t = 2, because being re-elected gives them a
utility of φ2 ; the second is the fact that voters have no information on what constitutes
the appropriate policy in each period and are therefore only able to evaluate incumbents
based on their track record in office; third, voters are perfectly able to observe the action
taken by the politician, in such a way that a flip-flop is immediately caught and used to
form reputations. My aim in this section is to relax these assumptions by introducing new
institutional features to the baseline model.
2.5.1 Single Term Limit
In the baseline model I analyzed above, the implicit assumption I make is that the incum-
bent can serve up to two terms in office, whereas the challenger can at most serve once,
since the game ends after the third period. As a result, it is interesting to see what would
happen under a single term limit rule, in which all politicians can serve only one term in
office 10. The single term limit for the President is an institution in several Latin American
countries 11, Israel and South Korea, as well as for the head of the European Central Bank,
among others. In the setup I describe in this model, the single term limit is a blunt yet
effective instrument to eliminate all distortions due to politicians’ willingness to avoid flip-
flopping. At the same time, however, having a single term limit also means forgoing the
possibility to condition the reelection decision on the beliefs about the incumbent’s type.
It follows that banning reelections is only welfare improving if the accountability distortion
from the flip-flop avoidance is large and the upside from retaining incumbents with a good
reputation is low.
Proposition 2. A single term limit is welfare improving if and only if:
b ≤ 2 (1− λ)A(1− σ
∗)(2ρ2 − 1)
1+λ2O+Eµ
2
2 + λ− λO − λλO
10Notice that my baseline model is not exactly a model of a two-term limit economy; if the challenger
was able to also serve two terms, then voters would expect him to be subject to electoral concerns in
his first period in office, meaning that he could avoid flip-flopping. As a result, they will always prefer
the incumbent when their reputations are the same: in other words, such a model would feature an
endogenous incumbency advantage.
11El Salvador, Mexico, Honduras and a few others.
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Intuitively, the condition states that the single-term limit rule is beneficial if the benefit
from selecting a competent politician is low enough. Moreover, notice that if λ → 1, the
right-hand side goes to 0, meaning that if the incumbent is competent with a sufficiently
high probability, even a very small benefit b is sufficient to prefer the re-electability of the
incumbent. The same happens if q → 12 or as φ → +∞, because in these cases lying will
be so prevalent to offset most of the learning about the incumbent.
Finally, notice that implementing a single term limit rule requires the ability to commit
(for example through a constitution) not to re-elect an incumbent thought to be competent
with a high probability 12.
2.5.2 Transparency of Actions: Reporting Media
Voters usually rely on the media to learn the policies chosen by politicians. In some
circumstances, for example when bills containing multiple prescriptions are voted 13, it
is not so straightforward to understand whether the incumbent politician flip-flopped or
played consistently. The same might happen when voting in a committee is secret and
knowing the result only enables to make probabilistic statements on whether a member
voted in a certain direction.
In this section I therefore relax the assumption of full observability of the incumbent’s
actions and evaluate its impact on social welfare. The fact that action transparency is not
always beneficial is well known in the literature 14. What I am going to show here is that
an imperfectly accurate reporting media is always optimal (or, in terms of transparency,
partial action transparency is always optimal), unless the equilibrium is truthful with a
fully accurate media in the first place.
Assume that the incumbent’s track record is only observable through the report of a me-
dia company, and that the media company’s reporting technology is not perfectly accurate:
given a true incumbent track record τ that displays flip-flopping, with probability 1−g the
media company sends out a report indicating that the politician acted consistently: the
12The idea of commitment to a single term limit is developped in a rather hyperbolic form by Calvino
(1969) in a short story in which he describes a hypothetical society in which leaders are beheaded at
the end of their term in office.
13An example of a situation in which it was not simple to label a policy choice as a flip-flop is the vote by
Bernie Sanders against the auto-industry bailout in January 2009: Sanders had actually supported the
bailout previously and supported it afterwards, but after having voted in favour of it, he voted against
the release of that tranche of aid since it also contained financial aid for the banking sector, which
Sanders was not in favour of bailing out. In the recent presidential primary election, Hillary Clinton
used this alleged flip-flop to attack Sanders.
14Prat (2005) again as the main example.
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same happens when the true track record is consistent 15. For example, a voter observing
a consistent track-record infers that the actual track-record of the incumbent is consistent
with probability:
pC = Pr(τ = C|τ˜ = C) = gPr(τ = C)
gPr(τ = C) + (1− g)Pr(τ = F )
while an analogous expression, denoted by pF , represents the probability that the true
track record is flip flopping given an observed flip-flopping record. Given her guess of the
incumbent’s strategy, the voter updates her beliefs and assigns a reputation to each true
track-record. Since she does not observe the true track record, the actual reputation that
she assigns to the politician is simply the weighted average of the reputations following
each track-record, weighted by the probability that the observed track-record is of each
type conditional on the observed media report. As a result, if g = 1 there is no noise (full
transparency) in the reporting media and we recover the baseline model, whereas if g = 12
there is no transparency and the reputation associated to each track-record is simply λ.
Since the lower g, the less voters can learn about the incumbent independently of his
behaviour, it is intuitive that truthful play can be restored for g low enough. It is also clear
that if this g, which I’ll denote by g∗, is larger than 12 , then having g < g
∗ is never optimal,
because once truthful play has been restored, lowering g only makes learning worse. What
is not straightforward is the fact that increasing g starting from g∗ is never optimal. The
following proposition shows that the optimal reporting accuracy is always the maximum g
sustaining truthful play.
Proposition 3. The optimal media reporting accuracy is g∗ ≤ 1. The value of g∗ is the
largest possible such that incumbents play truthfully. Therefore, g∗ < 1 whenever a truthful
equilibrium is not sustainable in the baseline model.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.
2.5.3 Transparency of Consequences: Commentator Media
So far I assumed that voters have no feedback on the state of the world before elections.
This serves the purpose of creating an environment in which all learning about the in-
cumbent is done through his track-record. In many situations, however, voters have some
15Notice that I do not need to fully specify whether the noise comes from the report of the second or the
first period action, or a mix of both: all I need is that noise is symmetric across the actions played by
politicians.
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information about the right policy choice. A fundamental role in this respect is again
played by the media.
In this section, therefore, I augment the baseline model with an additional player, which
I call commentator media to follow up on the contribution by Ashworth and Shotts (2010).
To keep the analysis as simple as possible I assume that the media is only active at the end
of t = 2, i.e. just before elections: this also reflects the fact that the coverage of politics
in the vicinity of elections is particularly salient. I assume that the media is endowed with
a signalling technology of accuracy qM >
1
2 (conditionally independent of the signal that
incumbents receive) and I abstract from strategic consideration on the part of the media
assuming that before election, the media truthfully reveals the realization of its signal sM .
What is going to happen is simply that voters now have another piece of information to
use when updating their beliefs on the incumbent type: reputation will not only depend on
whether the incumbent flip-flopped or played consistently, but also on whether the media
report endorses his second period action. In such a setup it seems natural that having an
informative signal on the state of the world will act as disciplining device for the incumbent.
The main result of this section, however, is to show that things need not work this way.
Proposition 4. Increasing the accuracy of the commentator media can increase flip-
flopping avoidance.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.
It is interesting to describe in some detail the circumstances in which an increase in media
accuracy increases the distortion to accountability. What is needed is a highly persistent
environment (high γ) and high level of competence of politicians (both high q and high λ).
In this context, increasing qM from the lower bound of
1
2 is initially marginally beneficial,
but as qM increases the effect reverses and further increasing qM (up to a point) increases
the distortion. When qM starts becoming very precise, however, there is a large benefit in
further increases of qM . In other words, in these environments a marginally informative
media is slightly beneficial, an informative but not very precise media is detrimental but a
very precise media is again beneficial.
The intuition behind this result is what we might define as politicians gambling on
the endorsement by the media. The force driving the result is the fact that when λ,
γ and q are large, then an increase in media accuracy qM sharply increases the payoff
value of a successful gamble, which is the difference in reputation between being consistent
and endorsed by the media and being a flip-flopper and opposed by the media, denoted
by µC,E − µF,O. On the other hand, the the payoff from a failed gamble, which is the
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difference in reputation between a consistent politician opposed by the media and a flip-
flopper endorsed by the media, or µC,O − µF,E , decreases more slowly (but it suddenly
drops when qM is sufficiently high, meaning that when the media is very well informed,
a non-endorsement is very costly in terms of reputation). Moreover, as long as the media
is not too informative, the probability S that the media signal matches the politician’s
flip-flopping signal remains close to 12 , making it likely for a politician avoiding a flip-flop
to gamble successfully. This result relies heavily on λ being high, which is what gives the
necessary curvature to the payoff from gambling on avoiding the flip-flop: in other words,
when most politicians are competent, increasing the informativeness of the media increases
the value of an endorsement significantly.
A related result is that when persistence γ, the share of competent politicians λ and
electoral concerns φ are all very high, it might be the case that incompetent politicians
distort their behaviour even under a perfect media signal qM = 1. In this case, flip-flopping
is such a strong signal of incompetence that politicians are willing to take a gamble in which
they lose the election for sure unless they receive a media endorsement.
The existence of potentially non-monotone responses of policy distortions to media accu-
racy can have interesting implications for issues such as the public subsidization of media
outlets. In persistent environment with a prevalence of competent politicians, subsidizing
media is only beneficial if very precise commentary is achieved. This could for example
suggest that concentrating resources into one or few high-quality outlets is better than
subsidizing many average ones. In particular, once the media is sufficiently informative,
returns to small increases in informativeness can be very large: in other words, in these
situations the devil is in the details.
Notice that when an increased accuracy of the commentator media increases flip-flopping
avoidance, accountability welfare decreases but selection welfare might still improve, so I
are not able to conclude that a more accurate commentator media is detrimental to welfare
tout court.
2.6 Predictability, Opportunism and Flip-flopping
The central aim of this paper is to provide a rationale of why voters dislike flip-flopping
politicians. The explanation I offer in this paper has to do with signalling competence:
since the information available to badly informed politicians is more likely to change, flip-
flopping is associated with incompetence.
Whereas information is certainly a component to the reasons why flip-floppers are dis-
liked, other explanations that are often brought forward in the political discourse have to
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do with predictability and opportunism. In this section I am going to show that the struc-
ture of my model can also be used to shed some light on these alternative explanations of
flip-flopping.
Let’s begin with predictability. One of the reasons voters dislike flip-floppers, as a matter
of fact, is because flip-floppers are seen to be less predictable candidates, and predictability
can be desirable when for example politicians lack commitment. In my model, when voters
see a flip-flop, they not only update negatively on the politician’s competence, but they also
assign a higher probability to a further flip-flop happening in the future period. In other
words, the model is consistent with the idea that flip-flopping politicians are unpredictable
(although predictability has no value per se for the voter in my model).
Proposition 5. Politicians who flip-flop before elections are also more likely to flip-flop
again if re-elected.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.
What about opportunism? My model is a model of opportunistic avoidance of flip-flops
rather than one of opportunistic flip-flops, and there is no readily available relabelling of
the model to fully catch that feature. However, if the signal politicians receive in my model
is interpreted as a signal concerning the opinion of the majority, then we can reinterpret
the model as saying that flip-floppers have a bad reputation because they are more likely
to be unskilled at understanding the opinion of majority of voters. In a world in which
all politicians are opportunists, in other words, flip-floppers are more likely to be bad
opportunists.
In future research I would like to address the question of opportunistic flip-flops more in
detail.
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper describes circumstances in which career concerned politicians have the incentive
to inefficiently stick to their previous policy positions in order to avoid the reputational
stigma of flip-flopping. This happens because voters are aware that policy shifts are more
likely to be performed by incompetent leaders. The incentive to avoid efficient policy shifts
damages voters’ welfare both in terms of policy effectiveness and selection of competent
candidates through elections.
In other words, this paper confirms the conventional wisdom that flip-flopping is bad for
the reputation of a politician, but at the same time it suggests that if electoral concerns
are strong enough, then the equilibrium displays insufficient flip-flopping. An additional
interesting implication of the mechanism described in the paper is that changes in the
fundamentals driving policy choices are likely to bring to leadership change, but politi-
cians substituting an incumbent after a change of state has occurred are on average less
competent than politicians entering power in stable times.
To sum up, my analysis provides a new example of how electoral competition can decrease
welfare: elections enable voters to retain the politicians they believe to be competent, but
at the same time they give potentially distortive incentives to politicians. In this context,
therefore, it might be optimal not to subject politicians to electoral incentives, by either
setting up a single term limit rule or handing decision power to a judiciary.
The problem highlighted in my paper might also be framed in terms of disclosure of
politicians’ actions. Going back to the excerpt from the British CFOI (1997) quoted at
the beginning of the paper, the statement “[...] where disclosure of the information in
question would be harmful to the frankness and candour of future discussions” makes a
specific reference for the distortion to what is denoted as “future frankness and candour”,
which is precisely what happens in my model: the policy taken in the first period by the
politician biases his second period action, making it potentially an expression of posturing
rather than candour.
Given that the distortion caused by electoral incentives works through the observability
of the politician’s actions, another way to eliminate the incentives for inefficient policy
choices is to relax the ability of voters to observe policy choices. In the realm of public
policy choices, the observability of a politician’s actions is to a large extent determined
by the media reporting. In such a context, I show that a less than fully accurate media
can partially insulate politicians from the flip-flopping stigma: for this reason having some
noise in the media is always optimal. This result suggests that the increasingly widespread
access to politicians’ track records made possible by the internet might in fact have a
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negative impact on the accountability of politicians.
Finally, I also show that when considering media with the function of endorsing the
policy choice of a politician, an increase in the accuracy of the media signal can in some
circumstances give politicians an even larger incentive to distort their choices avoiding
efficient policy shifts. In other words, giving voters more information to evaluate politicians’
track records can backfire, which has implications on for example the extent to which the
media should be subsidized.
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Appendix 2.A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let’s consider the choice of action at t = 2, politicians have already taken action
a1 and they know that if re-elected, which happens with probability
1
2 +
µ(a1,a2)−λO
2 , they
will get 2φ. On top of that, politicians get utility of 1 whenever they match the state of
the world, the probability of which depends on the posterior belief, denoted by Pr(ω2 =
s2|s1, qθ) = ρ2(s2, s1, qθ). In order to slightly simplify notation, denote the probability of
winning given reputation µ by r(µ). So r(µ) = 12 +
µ−λO
2 as r(µ). Given that there are
only two actions available, the politicians will calculate the reputation associated to each
action and follow his signal if and only if:
ρ2(s2, s1, qθ) + r(µ(a2 = s2, s1))2φ ≥ [1− ρ2(s2, s1, qθ)] + r(µ(a2 6= s2, s1))2φ.
It follows that in order to have σ(s2) = 1, the above condition needs to hold for both types
and both signal realizations given any of the two possible choices a1, which results in a set
of 8 inequalities.
However, it is immediate to notice that whenever a2 = s2 is the most reputable action,
i.e. µ(a2 = a1, a1) ≥ µ(a2 6= a1, a1), following the signal is unquestionably optimal. Since
consistency has a better reputation than flip-flopping, it follows that whenever s2 = a1,
a2 = s2, for each a1 and each type. This means that we are left with 4 conditions. Moreover,
since µT (0, 0) = µT (1, 1) and µT (1, 0) = µT (0, 1) and the same holds for ρ2(1, 0) = ρ2(0, 1),
we are left with only two conditions, one for each type:
ρ2(s2 6= s1, qθ) + r(µTF )2φ ≥ [1− ρ2(s2 6= s1, qθ)] + r(µTC)2φ,
which can be rearranged to:
2ρ2(s2 6= s1, qθ)− 1
φ
≥ µTC − µTF .
Thanks to the single-crossing property, the binding constraint for a truthful equilibrium is
the condition concerning the incompetent politician: whenever the incompetent politician
follows his signal, or is at least indifferent, the competent politician does, too. Conversely,
if the competent politician is indifferent or he doesn’t follow his signal, the incompetent
will also not follow it.
As a result, we know that if 2ρ2(s2 6=s1,q)−1φ ≥ µTC − µTF , politicians will follow their signal
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at t = 2. Rearranging we get the condition on φ, φ ≤ 2ρ2(s2 6=s1,q)−1
µTC−µTF
.
Let’s now see what happens at t = 1. If politicians know that they are going to follow
their signal at t = 2, then the dominant strategy at t = 1 is to follow their signal. Since all
that matters is being consistent versus flip-flopping, then given the persistence of the state,
it is more likely to end up in the favourable situation of playing consistently by following
one’s signal in the first period.
Trembling-hand perfection refinement eliminates pooling equilibria
Proof. In a pooling equilibrium, both politicians play the same track-record with proba-
bility one independent of the signals received. In other words, in these equilibria an action
in every period remains off-equilibrium, hence Bayes’ rule cannot restrict beliefs on these
actions in any way. It follows that if the reputation attached to any off equilibrium track-
record is sufficiently bad, then when electoral concerns are high enough politicians will not
have any incentive to deviate from the pooling track-record. Sufficient conditions for any
pooling equilibrium to be sustainable are that:
2ρ1 − 1 + Pr(s2 = s1|s1)(2ρ¯2 − 1) < (r(µ = λ)− r(µ = 0))2φ
and
2ρ¯2 − 1 < r(µ = λ)− r(µ = 0))2φ
Let’s now introduce the trembling-hand perfection requirement. Assume that with proba-
bility ǫ > 0 close to zero, a politician willing to play action a will instead play action a′.
Assume that ǫ is the same for both types. Take a pooling equilibrium. In any period, with
probability ǫ the voter observes an action different from that on the pooling track-record.
Since both politicians have the same strategy and ǫ is the same for both types, then the
reputation the voter must attach to actions outside the pooling track-record has to be λ,
the same as the reputation of the pooling track-record. However, this cannot happen in
equilibrium, because if the reputation of any track-record is the same, then incumbents
have an incentive to always follow their signal. In other words, no pooling equilibrium can
survive the trembling hand perfection requirement.
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Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. I split the proof in several parts. First of all I characterize the symmetric partially
truthful equilibrium.
Claim 1: Existence of Partially Truthful Equilibrium
In this equilibrium, µ(0, 0) = µ(1, 1) ≡ µC and µ(0, 1) = µ(1, 0) ≡ µF by symmetry
and µC > µF . Moreover, assume for now that incumbents always follows their signal at
t = 1. Consider now period t = 2. After following their signal in period 1, in period 2 the
incumbent has to decide whether to follow his signal or not. When s2 = a1, the incumbent
always follows his signal, because:
ρ2(s1, s2 = s1, θ) + r(µC)2φ > (1− ρ2(s1, s2 = s1, θ) + r(µF )2φ
since µC > µF insures that r(µC) > r(µF ) and ρ2 > 1 − ρ2 by the decision relevance of
signals. However, when s2 6= a1, the incumbent has a tradeoff. From Proposition 1, a
truthful equilibrium requires that:
ρ2(s1, s2 6= s1, L) + r(µF )2φ ≥ (1− ρ2(s1, s2 6= s1, L)) + r(µC)2φ,
from which the upper bound φ¯ was derived. Moreover, we know from Fact 2 (single-crossing
property), that the following holds:
ρ2(s1, s2 6= s1, L) + r(µ′F ) ≥ 1− ρ2(s1, s2 6= s1, L) + r(µ′C)⇒
ρ2(s1, s2 6= s1, H) + r(µ′F ) > 1− ρ2(s1, s2 6= s1, H) + r(µ′C)
and
ρ2(s1, s2 6= s1, H) + r(µ′F ) ≤ 1− ρ2(s1, s2 6= s1, H) + r(µ′C)⇒
ρ2(s1, s2 6= s1, L) + r(µ′F ) > 1− ρ2(s1, s2 6= s1, L) + r(µ′C)
This means that we are left with three possibilities: both politicians play a2 6= s2 when
that involves flip-flopping, or the high type mixes between a2 = s2 and a2 = s2, or the
high type always plays a2 = s2 and the low type mixes. I will now prove that the first two
cannot be part of an equilibrium. Assume that both politicians play a2 6= s2 when s2 6= a1.
Then, nobody would flip-flop and therefore, in a candidate equilibrium µC = µF ; in this
case, however, the optimal strategy for the incumbent is to follow his signal. Consider now
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the other case, i.e. that when s2 6= a1, the high type mixes between a2 = s2 and a2 6= s2
while the low type always plays a2 6= s2. If this were an equilibrium, then flip-flopping
would reveal the high type, and therefore µF = 1 > µC . In such a situation, however, the
incumbent would always flip-flop. It follows that the only possibility when s2 6= a1 is that
the high type follows his signal whereas the low type mixes between the two actions. The
low type mixes when the following holds:
2ρ2(s1, s2 6= s1, L)− 1
φ
=
λγ
λγ + (1− λ)(1−Aσ∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
µC
− λ(1− γ)
λ(1− γ) + (1− λ)Aσ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
µF
(2.2)
In order to show existence and uniqueness of such an equilibrium, consider σ∗ ∈ [0, 1]. It
holds from Proposition 1 that at σ∗ = 1, 2ρ2(s1,s2 6=s1,L)−1φ < µc − µF . At the same time,
at σ∗ = 0 it has to be that 2ρ2(s1,s2 6=s1,L)−1φ > µc − µF , since in that case µF = 1. By
continuity of µC − µF , an equilibrium with σ∗ ∈ (0, 1) exists. Moreover, notice that µC
is strictly increasing in σ∗ while µF is strictly decreasing in σ∗, and therefore the σ∗ such
that (2.2) is unique. Finally, consider the action choice at t = 1. It holds that µC > µF
and the incumbent knows he is going to follow his signal when s2 = s1. Moreover, the
incumbent knows that, because of the persistence of the state of the world, given s1 it is
more likely for him to receive s2 = s1. However, the utility of receiving s2 = s1 is higher
when a1 = s1 than when a1 6= s1. As a result, following the signal at t = 1 is optimal
both in terms of instantaneous payoff and in terms of future payoff. Mathematically,
denote by π(θ) = Pr(s2 = s1|s1). Notice that since γ > 12 , π > 12 and notice that
π(θ)ρ2(s1, s2 = s1, θ) + (1 − π(θ))ρ2(s1, s2 6= s1, θ) = ρ1(s1, θ)γ + (1 − ρ1(s1, θ))(1 − γ).
Denote also by ρ¯2 = ρ2(s1, s2 = s1, θ) and by ρ2 = ρ2(s1, s2 6= s1, θ). With this notation,
following one’s signal at t1 requires the following condition to hold:
ρ1 + π(ρ¯2 + rC2φ) + (1− π)(ρ2 + rF 2φ) ≥ (1− ρ1) + π(ρ¯2 + rF 2φ) + (1− π)(ρ2 + rC2φ)
which can be rearranged to
(2ρ1 − 1) ≥ −(2π − 1)(rC − rF )2φ
which always holds. Hence both types follow their signal at t = 1.
To sum up, I have showed the existence of a unique symmetric partially truthful equilib-
rium (it would be truthful if φ ≤ φ¯) with and µC > µF . Both politicians follow their signal
at t = 1. At t = 2, the high type always follows his signal, whereas the low type follows
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his signal with probability 1 when if s2 = s1 and mixes playing a2 = s2 with probability
σ∗ ∈ (0, 1) when s2 6= s1.
Claim 2: Uniqueness of Symmetric Non-Pooling Equilibrium
In Claim 1 I have shown that if µC > µF , then the equilibrium is the partially truthful
one I characterized (or truthful, depending on φ). I will now prove that remaining in the
realm of symmetric equilibria, there exists no equilibrium where µF > µC . By claim 1, if
a1 = s1 for both politicians the unique equilibrium is the (partially) truthful one. Let’s
then assume that (2ρ1 − 1) < (2π− 1)(rF − rC)2φ for some incumbent type. Assume that
the incumbent played an action a1 6= s1. Since µF > µC , at t = 2 the optimal choice is to
follow the signal when s2 = s1 whereas a tradeoff arises when s2 6= s1. However, notice that
2ρ1−1
2π−1 > 2ρ2−1, because π = γq+(1−γ)(1−q) < q given that q > 12 . Therefore, whenever
the incumbent plays a1 6= s1, at t = 2 he would always play a2 6= a1. However, this cannot
be part of an equilibrium. If the incumbent knows he is always going to flip flop, as a
matter of fact, then the optimal strategy is to follow the first signal and then deviate if
s2 = s1. The reason is that the such a strategy gives the incumbent the same reputation
but it is less expensive in terms of policy costs, since π(2ρ¯2−1) < (2ρ1−1)+(1−π)(2ρ2−1).
This can in fact be rearranged to yield:
[2(ρ1γ + (1− ρ1)(1− γ))− 1]− (1− π)(2ρ2 − 1) < 2ρ1 − 1 + (1− π)(2ρ2 − 1).
Claim 3: Non-Existence of Asymmetric Equilibria
I prove this result in several substeps.
Step 1: If a1 = s1, the equilibrium in the subgame starting at t = 2 is either truthful or
partially truthful.
Proof. This was proved in Claim 1.
Step 2: If for some type a2 = s2 with strictly positive probability, then for that type
a1 = s1.
Proof. Denote by α and β the gap between the consistent and flip-flopping reputation
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after action a1 = 1 and a1 = 0 respectively. Moreover, denote by c1 =
2ρ1−1
φ . Denote by
π = Prob(s2 = s1|s1). If some type contradicts the signal at t = 1 with some probability
after both signal realizations, and then plays a2 = s2 with some positive probability at
t = 2, the following has to hold:
µ(1, 0)− µ(0, 1) = c1 + π[µ(0, 0)− µ(0, 1)]− (1− π)[µ(1, 1)− µ(1, 0)]
µ(0, 1)− µ(1, 0) = c1 + π[µ(1, 1)− µ(1, 0)]− (1− π)[µ(0, 0)− µ(0, 1)]
µ(0, 0)− µ(0, 1) = β
µ(1, 1)− µ(1, 0) = α
Substituting the last two equations into the first two, and then the second into the first,
we obtain the following condition:
c1 = −(2π − 1)α+ β
2
.
Now, whenever negative, α+β2 ∈ [−1, 0]. However, c12π−1 > 1 since π < ρ1. So this equality
can never hold. This means that it is never the case that an incumbent contradicts the
signal with some probability after both realizations of s1.
Consider the case of a potential equilibrium in which in the first period, the incompetent
politician mixes after receiving one of the signals. Let’s consider, without loss of generality,
a candidate equilibrium in which Pr(a1 = 1|s1 = 1) = σ1 < 1. When the voter observes
a1 = 1, however, she knows that it is a genuine realization of s1 = 1. As a result,
the game play after a1 = 1 is the same as that in the partially truthful equilibrium.
Hence, µ(1, 1) > µ(1, 0) and µ(1, 1) − µ(1, 0) ≤ c2. There are now therefore two cases:
µ(0, 0) > µ(1, 0) and µ(0, 0) < µ(1, 0). If µ(0, 0) > µ(0, 1), then since we are considering
equilibria in which there is at least partialy truthful play at t = 2, it has to be that
µ(0, 0) − µ(0, 1) ≤ c2. Since the average reputation after a1 = 1 is larger than after
a1 = 0, because just incompetents are deviating, then it has to be that µ(1, 1) ≥ µ(0, 1).
However, in order for the incumbent to have the incentive to deviate from s1 = 1 it has
to be the case that c1 + (πµ(1, 1) + (1 − π)µ(1, 0)) ≤ πµ(0, 1) + (1 − π)µ(0, 0). However,
πµ(0, 1)+ (1−π)µ(0, 0)− (πµ(1, 1)+ (1−π)µ(1, 0)) can be at most 2(1−π)c2 without the
condition that µ(1, 1) ≥ µ(0, 1) being violated. Since c1 > 2(1− π)c2, then this distance is
not enough to give the politician the incentive to deviate after s1 = 1.
If µ(0, 0) > µ(0, 1), and µ(0, 0)−µ(0, 1) ≤ c2, consider that since the average reputation
after a1 = 1 is larger than after a1 = 0, because just incompetents are deviating, then
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it has to be that µ(1, 1) ≥ µ(0, 1). However, in order for the incumbent to have the
incentive to deviate from s1 = 1 it has to be the case that c1+(πµ(1, 1)+(1−π)µ(1, 0)) ≤
πµ(0, 1)+(1−π)µ(0, 0). However, πµ(0, 1)+(1−π)µ(0, 0)− (πµ(1, 1)+(1−π)µ(1, 0)) can
be at most 2(1 − π)c2 without the condition that µ(1, 1) ≥ µ(0, 1) being violated. Since
c1 > 2(1 − π)c2, then this distance is not enough to give the politician the incentive to
deviate after s1 = 1.
Let’s now consider the case in which µ(0, 1) > µ(0, 0). If µ(0, 1)− µ(0, 0) ≤ c2, then we
can immediately see that πµ(0, 1)+(1−π)µ(0, 0)−(πµ(1, 1)+(1−π)µ(1, 0)) ≤ c2, but since
c2 < c1, again the incumbent cannot have the incentive to deviate without µ(0, 0) > µ(1, 1);
however, if µ(0, 0) > µ(1, 1) the reputation after action a1 = 0 is strictly larger than after
a1 = 1, which is a contradiction.
Step 3: there is no equilibrium in which some type does not follow the signal at t = 1
with probability 1 and then contradicts one realization of the signal at t = 2.
Proof. Impossible for a high type to contradict the signal at t = 2, unless that is a pooling
equilibrium (which we remove). Therefore, assume a low type contradicted s1. Without
loss of generality, assume that a low type who received signal s1 = 0 played instead a1 = 1.
If µ(1, 1) > µ(1, 0), then there are two possibilities: if action a1 = 1 is only played by high
types and low types who received a signal s1 = 0, then contradicting signal s2 = 0 would
lead to τ = (1, 0) to be revealing of the high type, which cannot happen in equilibrium. If
a1 = 1 were also to be played by low types receiving signal s1 = 1, then if the low types
who received s1 = 0 contradict their signal s2 = 0, also the low types receiving s2 = 0 after
having received s1 = 1 and played a1 = 1 would do that. And therefore τ = (1, 0) would
be revealing of the high type, which cannot hapen in equilibrium. So contradicting the
signal s10 at t = 1 requires µ(1, 0) > µ(1, 1). Since the high type plays truthfully at t = 2,
however, conditional on a1 = 1 he plays a2 = 1 more often than a2 = 0. Therefore, µ(1, 0)
cannot be larger than µ(1, 1).
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The average reputation is constant in equilibrium and equal to λ, hence Pr(τ =
C)µC+Pr(τ = F )µF = λ. This allows us to rewrite Pr(τ = C) =
λ−µF
µC−µF . From the model
we know that selection improves if and only if the second moment m2 of the distribution of
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reputation, m2 = Pr(τ = C)µ
2
C + (1− Pr(τ = C))µ2F , increases. Moreover, in equilibrium
it holds that µC ≥ µF and Pr(τ = C) > Pr(τ = F ). Taking the expression for the second
moment and substituting in the restriction due to the constant mean yields:
m2 =
λ− µF
µC − µF µ
2
C + [1−
λ− µF
µC − µF ]µ
2
F
Let’s now write the expression of a contour line, in the (µC , µF ) plane, along which the
value of the second moment is constant; using implicit differentiation one gets:
∂µF
∂µC
=
λ− µF
µC − λ
It can be seen that this contour line is increasing in µC and concave. This means that
the second moment increases by increasing µC and decreasing µF . Moreover, notice that
since in equilibrium µC > µF , Pr(µC) > Pr(µF ) and Pr(µC)µC + Pr(µF )µF = λ, then
µC − λ < λ − µF . So ∂µF∂µC ≥ 1 in equilibrium. As a result, therefore, whenever µC − µF
increases and µC increases, the second momentm2 has to increase and with it also selection
welfare increases. Thus can be immediately be seen graphically, since the contour line of
the second moment is increasing and concave and the line along which µC −µF is constant
is increasing with a slope of 1. In other words, knowing the size of µC − µF is sufficient to
compare the selection welfare across different equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The welfare expression (2.1) derived in the text reads:
W = [λ+ (1− λ)q] + [λ+ (1− λ)q˜] + b
[
1
4
+
λ2O
4
− λλO
2
+
λ+ λO
2
+
Eµ2
4
]
With a single term limit, politicians can do no better than following their signal, since
there is no re-election possibility. This generates a gain of
(1− λ)A(1− σ∗)(2ρ2 − 1)
At the same time, however, a single term limit corresponds to a commitment to choosing
the challenger no matter what the belief about the incumbent is. Therefore, society gets the
benefit b with probability λO, plus Ev = 0. The utility from the selection of the right type
of politician is therefore λOb rather than b
[
1
4 +
λ2O
4 − λλO2 + λ+λO2 + Eµ
2
4
]
This generates a
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loss in terms of selection welfare expressed by:
b
(
1
4
+
λ2O
4
− λλO
2
+
λ− λO
2
+
Eµ2
4
)
It follows that having a single term limit is beneficial if the following inequality holds:
(1− λ)A(1− σ∗)(2ρ2 − 1) ≥ b
(
1
4
+
λ2O
4
− λλO
2
+
λ− λO
2
+
Eµ2
4
)
Lemma 2: pC + pF increasing in σ
Proof. pC =
gPr(τ=C)
gPr(τ=C)+(1−g)Pr(τ=F ) and pF =
gPr(τ=F )
gPr(τ=F )+(1−g)Pr(τ=C) . Now, remember that
µC =
λγ
λγ+(1−λ)(1−Aσ) =
λγ
Pr(τ=C) and similarly, µF =
λ(1−γ)
Pr(τ=F ) . Substituting these into the
expression for pC and pF one gets the following expressions:
pC =
gγµF
gγµF + (1− g)(1− γ)µC
and
pF =
g(1− γ)µC
g(1− γ)µC + (1− g)(1− γ)µF .
Let’s now denote by DC and DF the denominators of µC and µF respectively and by
DenC and DenF the denominator of pC and pF respectively. First of all, let’s establish that
DenF < DenC . This clearly holds since g(1−γ)µC+(1−g)γµF < gγµF +(1−g)(1−γ)µC
can be rearranged to yield DC > DF , which is always satisfied. Let’s now look at the
numerator of the derivatives of pC and pF with respect to σ. The former is:
−gγ(1− γ)λ(1− λ)A
D2F
DenC − λ(1− λ)Aγ(1− γ)A[ (1− g)
D2C
− g
D2F
]gγµF
and the latter is:
gγ(1− γ)λ(1− λ)A
D2C
DenF − λ(1− λ)Aγ(1− γ)A[ g
D2C
− (1− g)
D2F
]g(1− γ)µC
Substituting for DenF and DenC and rearranging one can see that the numerators only
differ in the sign: pC decreases as σ increases, whereas pF increases. However, since
DenF < DenC , then the positive effect from pF dominates.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. In terms of first period behaviour, nothing changes with respect to the baseline
model: it can therefore be proved that all incumbents follow their signal at t = 1 by using
the same arguments provided for the baseline model (refer to the proof of Theorem 1).
Let’s now move to the decision to be taken at t = 2. An incumbent receiving a signal
that suggests him to flip-flop knows that if he does flip-flop, with probability g voters will
observe a media report indicating he has been consistent, and viceversa if he goes against
his signal and avoids the flip-flop there is a probability 1−g that his track record will come
across as flip-flopping. It immediate to see, therefore, that given any two reputation levels,
the incentive to strategically avoid the flip-flop is smaller when the reporting media is noisy.
However, the voter is aware of the noisy signal received from the media and therefore she
also adjusts her beliefs: whenever observing a flip-flopping track-record, for example, the
voter knows that with some probability, the politician actually played consistently and
viceversa. In particular, let’s fix the strategy played by incumbents, and in particular let’s
assume that incompetent incumbents follow a flip-flopping signal with probability σ. If
the voter were able to observe track-records perfectly, beliefs would be µC(σ) and µF (σ).
Given the noise, the belief the incumbent is competent when observing a consistent track-
record is µ˜C = pCµC(σ) + (1 − pC)µF (σ), where pC = gPr(τ=C)gPr(τ=C)+(1−g)Pr(τ=F ) . Analogous
expressions, denoted by µ˜F and pF , hold for the case in which the voter observes a flip-
flopping track-record and are derived by simply swapping C with F . Denote now for
simplicity by ρ ≡ ρ2(s2 6= s1, q). It follows that the incumbent prefers to follow a flip-
flopping signal whenever the following inequality holds:
ρ+ gr(µ˜C)2φ+ (1− g)r(µ˜F )2φ ≥ 1− ρ+ gr(µ˜C)2φ+ (1− g)r(µ˜F )2φ
Using the definitions of µ˜C and µ˜F , this expression can be rearranged to yield the following:
2ρ− 1
φ
≥ (2g − 1)(µ˜C − µ˜F )
and further to get:
2ρ− 1
φ
≥ (2g − 1)(pC + pF − 1)(µC − µF )
Notice that if g = 1, i.e. no noise, then one gets back to the expression from the baseline
model, given also that pC(g = 1) = 1 = pF (g = 1). Let’s now consider the case in which a
truthful equilibrium is not sustainable when g = 1, since 2ρ−1φ < (µ
T
C −µTF ). When noise is
introduces, the right hand side becomes (2g − 1)(pC + pF − 1)(µTC − µTF ). It is immediate
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to check that given µTC and µ
T
F , the right-hand side strictly decreases as g becomes smaller
than one. This means that there is a level of noise g∗ ∈ (12 , 1) such that
2ρ− 1
φ
= (2g∗ − 1)(pC(g∗, µT ) + pF (g∗, µT )− 1)(µTC − µTF ).
Moreover, remember that µC(σ) − µF (σ) is strictly increasing in σ and by Lemma 2 it
follows that pC(gˆ, µ
T ) + pF (gˆ, µ
T ) − 1 is also strictly increasing in σ. As a result, then,
decreasing g always increases the equilibrium level of σ. This means that as long as σ < 1,
decreasing g will alleviate the accountability distortion caused by incumbents avoiding
flip-flops. Since the equilibrium level of µ˜C − µ˜F increases as g decreases (as long as
σ < 1), because in equilibrium 2ρ−1φ ≥ (2g − 1)(µ˜C − µ˜F ), then the selection of politicians
also improves thanks to Lemma 1. As a result, decreasing g improves welfare as long
as it crowds out the lies of politicians. Decreasing g below g∗, however, µC − µF cannot
increase further and hence incompetent incumbents start having a strict preference towards
following their signal when it prescribes a flip-flop. Therefore, decreasing g further will hurt
learning and have no benefit on accountability. It follows that g∗ is the optimal level of
news informativeness.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Let’s start the analysis by writing the modified reputations. Given that there are
now two signals (the track record and the media signal) we now have four different reputa-
tions. I denote by µC,E and µF,O the reputation from consistent play given that the media
endorses (E) or opposes (O) the politician’s decision. Given this notation, the reputation
expressions can be written in the following way:
µC,E =
λγqM
λγqM + (1− λ)[(p2qqM + (1− p2)(1− q)(1− qM )) + ((1− p2)q(1− qM ) + p2(1− q)qM )(1− σ)]
µF,E =
λ(1− γ)qM
λ(1− γ)qM + (1− λ)((1− p2)q(1− qM ) + p2(1− q)qM )σ
µC,O =
λγ(1− qM )
λγ(1− qM ) + (1− λ)[((1− p2)q(1− qM ) + p2(1− q)qM ) + ((1− p2)qqM + p2(1− q)(1− qM ))(1− σ)]
µF,O =
λ(1− γ)(1− qM )
λ(1− γ)(1− qM ) + (1− λ)((1− p2)q(1− qM ) + p2(1− q)qM )σ
Notice that if qM =
1
2 , then we get back to the expressions used in the baseline model.
Moreover, notice that compared to the reputations from the baseline model, µC,E > µC >
µC,O and the analogous inequality holds for the flip-flopping reputations. Now, denote by
S = Pr(sM = F |sP = F ) = ρ2qM + (1 − ρ2)(1 − qM ), i.e. the probability that, given the
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incumbent’s signal is flip-flopping, the media signal also endorses a flip-flop. It turns out
that when they receive a flip-flopping signal, incompetent incumbents follow their signal if
the following inequality holds:
2ρ2 − 1
φ+ q
= [SµC,O + (1− S)µC,E ]− [SµF,E + (1− S)µF,O]
The expression can be rearranged to yield:
2ρ2 − 1
φ+ q
= S[µC,O − µF,E ] + (1− S)[µC,E − µF,O]
Using implicit differentiation one can see that σ∗ can decrease when qM increases. In
such a situation, accountability welfare decreases. In fact, it is sufficient to look at is the
derivative of the right-hand side of the expression above with respect to qM . In particular,
if the right hand side increases in qM , then σ
∗ needs to decrease for equilibrium to be
restored. Differentiating the right-hand side we get the following condition for an increase
in qM to decrease σ
∗:
(2ρ2−1)[(µC,O−µF,E)−(µC,E−µF,O)]+(1−S)
[
∂µC,E
∂qM
− ∂µF,O
∂qM
]
−S
[
∂µF,E
∂qM
− ∂µC,O
∂qM
]
> 0
It turns out that the above inequality holds when γ and q are both high (with γ potentially
higher than q), λ is sufficiently high and qM is not too high. In this situation, increasing
the informativeness of the commentator signal has the effect of increasing the distortion to
accountability.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. The proof just consists of simple algebra. Denote by p3 = γρ2+(1− γ)(1− ρ2) and
p¯3 = γρ¯2 + (1− γ)(1− ρ¯2). We have:
Pr(a3 = a2|a2 = a1) =
= µCγ + (1− µC)[Pr(s2 = s1|a2 = a1, L)(qp¯3 + (1− q)(1− p¯3))+
(+1− Pr(s2 = s1|a2 = a1, L))((1− q)p3 + q(1− p3))]
and
Pr(a3 = a2|a2 = a1) = µFγ + (1− µF )(qp3 + (1− q)(1− p3))
Moreover, Pr(s2 = s1|a2 = a1, L) = 1−A1−Aσ∗ . All I want to show is that Pr(a3 = a2|a2 =
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a1) ≥ Pr(a3 = a2|a2 = a1). Using the expressions for the probabilities and rearranging
yields:
1−A
1−Aσ∗ ≥
2p¯3 − 1
p¯3 + p3 − 1
Since only the left-hand side depends on σ∗, and it is strictly increasing in σ∗, then evalu-
ating the inequality at the lower bound on σ∗, i.e. σ = 1−γA , works as a sufficient condition.
Substituting in for p¯3 and p3 and σ yields:
2(1− γ)− 1 + 2(2γ − 1)ρ2
2(1− γ)− 1 + (2γ − 1)(ρ2 + ρ¯2) ≥
1− γ
γ
2q(1− q) + (q2 + (1− q)2)
and it can be checked numerically that this condition is always satisfied for the parameter
values of interest for the model.
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3 Candidates, Leaks and Media
This is joint work with Antoni Italo De Moragas
We present a model of a media market in which a set of news outlets compete to break
a news. In our model, each media receives some information on whether a politician in
office is corrupt. Media outlets can decide whether to break the story immediately or
wait and fact-check, taking into account that if another media breaks the news, the profit
opportunity disappears. We show that as the number of competitors increases, each outlet
becomes more likely to break the news without fact-checking. Therefore, as the number
of media increases, the incumbent politician is more likely to be accused of corruption by
the media: this makes the re-election of incumbents more difficult and increases political
turnover. In particular, we show that if voters consult with higher priority the media
outlets that report about a scandal, increasing the number of competitors decreases the
probability of having an honest politician in office.
3.1 Introduction
The news media play a fundamental role in providing political information to citizens and
keeping candidates and elected officials accountable to public opinion (Stro¨mberg, 2015).
In order to fulfill their role, news media act as a filter between the information they receive
from their sources and the information they transmit to the public. At the heart of this
process lies what is often called fact-checking, which means verifying the claims of a source
before publishing a report. A crucial question, therefore, is whether competition gives
media outlets the incentive to undertake this very important task.
In this paper we show that this might not be the case: in our model, competition between
media outlets crowds out fact-checking and leads to faster but more inaccurate reporting.
In order to investigate what broader effects this might have on society, we introduce an
electoral choice and describe how the less fact-checked information provided by the media
to voters can distort it.
In our model, we consider a set of news outlets competing to break a news. Each media
receives some information on whether a politician in office is corrupt. Media outlets can
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decide whether to break the story immediately or wait and fact-check. The benefit of
fact-checking is to allow a media outlet to be sure about the validity of the rumour. Since
publishing a fake story is costly for the media outlet 1, fact-checking therefore prevents
fake scandals from making the news and affecting a reader’s electoral choice. The cost of
fact-checking consists in having to put the publication of a story on hold, thus giving other
firms the opportunity to break the news, leaving the firm that decided to fact check with
nothing.
We show that as the number of competitors increases, each outlet becomes more likely
to break the story without fact checking. This, in turn, makes incumbent politicians
increasingly likely to be accused of corruption, hurting their chances of re-election. This
does not only affect corrupt incumbents, but also honest incumbents which might be ousted
from office and replaced with corrupt challengers.
Interestingly, we show that if there is a pecking order such that whenever some media
outlet reports the scandal, readers are exposed to that news (for example because they
preferably buy the newspaper whose headline mentions the scandal, or because they google
search for scandals involving the politician) then increasing the number of media makes it
less likely for an honest politician to win the election.
The changes in the media landscape that happened in recent years, especially due to
the ever growing importance of the internet, seem to well fit the conditions implied by
our model for a decrease in news quality (and the resulting effect on the quality of elected
politicians).
First of all, the internet has dramatically decreased the entry barriers into the news media
sector: setting up a blog does not require significant capital or expertise, but gives anybody
access to a potentially vast market of readers 2. Secondly, the role of the internet and social
media in the spread of news has transformed the way in which media outlets compete. In a
world of around the clock news, being the first to cover an event is fundamental to increase
traffic and earn through advertisements. Moreover, news of scandals travel very fast on
social media. Since not reporting on a scandal does not go viral, readers are more likely to
be exposed to the outlets that talk about a scandal rather than to those that don’t.
In light of this, the mechanism described in our model might help interpreting the con-
sistent decrease in the level of trust in the accuracy and fairness of media that took place in
1The channel through which publishing a fake scandal is costly for a media outlet is not made endogenous
in our model. Two explanations can be libel lawsuit and reputation. However, how these two channel
interact with the dynamics of publication and with the number of outlets is left unanswered by our
model and could be object of future research.
2The trend towards an increased number of media outlets is not limited to the internet: see for example
Cage´ (2016).
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the last two decades. According to a poll by Gallup in 2017 in the United States, confidence
in printed newspapers stands at around 27%, whereas it is even lower for other media such
as television news (24%) and internet news (16%)3.
Moreover, our work can pose a caveat on the idea that pluralism should bolster the
quality of news, which is the backbone of theories such as the marketplace for ideas and
that is also predicted by models such as Besley and Prat (2006). In other words, whilst
pluralism and competition might insure against the risk of capture by interest groups, the
decrease in fact-checking might act as a countervailing effect.
3.1.1 Historical Evidence: Yellow Journalism
Looking at the history of journalism there are several examples of how competition can
lead to a lowering of publication standards: an interesting case in point is the so called
Yellow Journalism period in the United States towards the end of the nineteenth century.
As the number of media outlets increased, prices decreased and competition started to be
centred on circulation, especially in large cities such as New York, where entrepreneurial
and ambitious media owners such as Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst led the
industry. Competition was fierce and newspapers battled to attract potential buyers on the
streets with enlarged headlines mentioning sensational, scandal-ripe and often completely
unsubstantiated stories 4.
Consistently with this view, Zaller (1999) underlines how the first half of the twentieth
century saw both a toning down from the sensationalism and muckraking of the yellow
journalism era and a dramatic fall in competition.
One of the consequences of the aggressive reporting style of the yellow journalism era
can be found in the Spanish-American war of 1898. The newspapers led by Pulitzer and
Hearst, as a matter of fact, played a decisive role in making public opinion call for a war.
One of the highlights of the media campaign against Spain was the stream of accusations
(mostly not backed up by evidence) following the sinking of the USS Maine ship in the
Havana Harbour. As the historian Allan Keller wrote: “Had these publishing titans not
decided to slug it out toe to toe, the efforts of the downtrodden Cubans to throw off the yoke
of Spanish oppression might never have burgeoned into a war between Spain and the United
States”.
The story of the Spanish-American war also brings to mind the much more recent case of
Iraq and the alleged weapons of mass destruction possessed by Saddam Hussein’s regime;
3 http://www.gallup.com/poll/212852/confidence-newspapers-low-rising.aspx
4For an account of yellow journalism and circulation war, refer for example to
https://publicdomainreview.org/collections/yellow-journalism-the-fake-news-of-the-19th-century/
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that is another important example of a competitive and pluralistic media failing to debunk
a fake story, which then led to a tragic and costly war.
3.1.2 Selection of Related Literature
The potentially negative effects of media competition have been picked up by media schol-
ars. This is a quote from a book by Thompson (2013): “The pressure to run a story
before one’s competitors acts as an incentive to disclose information that could spark off a
scandal, or which could fuel a scandal which is already underway” 5.
From an empirical point of view, the question of what are the consequences of a more
pluralistic media market has been addressed by several scholars. For example, Gentzkow,
Shapiro, and Sinkinson (2011) use a long time series of newspaper entry and exit to study
its effects on political participation and electoral competition, focussing on the years 1869-
1928. They find that newspaper entry increases turnout but they find it has no significant
effects on incumbency advantage. Despite not being statistically significant, their point
estimates of the effect of an additional newspaper on incumbency advantage are negative,
i.e. in the direction predicted by our model. Drago, Nannicini, and Sobbrio (2014) carry out
a similar exercise with data on Italian local newspapers. They find, in line with Gentzkow,
Shapiro, and Sinkinson (2011), a positive effect of the number of newspapers on voters’
participation in elections. In terms of incumbency advantage, they find an increase in the
re-election probability of mayors who decide to rerun (they find no significant difference
in the probability for incumbents to run for re-election). The authors claim that the
positive effect on incumbency advantage is mostly due to increased incentives rather than
selection: in fact, they find that an increase in the number of newspapers has no effect on
the characteristics of elected officials, but it positively affects the efficiency of public policy.
Another paper addressing the effects of an increase in the number of media outlets is
the above-mentioned Besley and Prat (2006). Their model shows that media pluralism
decreases the risk of capture by corrupt politicians. The main idea is that as the number
of media increases, a corrupt politician or interest group would have to pay monopolist
profits to each outlet in order to prevent the publication of a scandal: therefore, the larger
the number of media, the more expensive it is for interest groups to prevent the publication
5In a similar way, Garrard and Newell (2006) claim that: “[...] modern scandals are mediated, shaped
to varying degrees by the priorities of those reporting them. This has rightly led some commentators
to wonder whether the priorities of capitalist (even public-service) media competition have produced
behaviour disfunctional for the liberal democracies that modern industrial capitalism tends to produce.
[...] Whilst the latter require the spread of serious information and debate, the competitive priorities
of the former, particularly mass-circulation tabloids, point increasingly to sensationalism, titillation,
entertainment and trivialisation.”
76
of a corruption scandal and the better for voters. Our model shows that if the concern
is not capture but reporting accuracy, competition can instead be detrimental for voters
welfare.
Our work is also related to Cage´ (2017). Her model is based on vertical product differ-
entiation and it shows that the effect of entry on quality depends on the heterogeneity of
readers: with no heterogeneity, there is no change in quality but simply a splitting of the
market, whereas with heterogeneous readers newspapers differentiate on quality in order
to soften price competition. Moreover, with heterogeneity on more dimensions, duopolists
reduce quality on the less heterogeneous dimension. In our model, on the other hand, read-
ers are homogeneous, but nonetheless we get that an increase in the number of firms leads
to news of lower quality. Whereas we abstract from price competition, firms compete on
breaking the news, and the cost of quality is represented by increased time to publication:
the increased competition on being first on a news is what leads to a decrease in quality
as the number of firms increases. Finally, compared to Cage’s model, our model can deal
with any number of firms and not just monopoly versus duopoly.
Finally, Gratton, Holden, and Kolotilin (2016) present a model of strategic leak timing
which is also connected with out work. In their model, good and bad leakers (who respec-
tively have a true or a fake piece of information on a political scandal), try to influence the
outcome of an election. In their model the media is not specifically modeled, but once a
leak is released, a learning process takes place, which can uncover the truth. In our model,
instead, the initial leak reaches all media at the same time and we focus on the gatekeeping
role of profit maximizing media outlets in deciding whether to release the information, with
the objective of media being profit.
3.2 The Model
Consider a media market composed by N media outlets playing across 2 periods. In each
period, a state of the world ω ∈ {0, 1} is independently drawn such that Pr(ω = 1) = p.
When the realization of the state is ω = 1 there is a political scandal, whereas ω = 0 means
that there is no scandal. We will later addition this simple model of media competition
without politicians with an electoral choice between an incumbent and a challenger in order
to evaluate the effects of news reporting on elections.
Each media i receives a signal si about ω, distributed according to some full support
density function fω(s) for each state of the world ω, with cumulative distribution function
Fω(s). Let ψ(s) =
f1(s)
f0(s)
denote the likelihood ratio at s. We will assume that ψ(s)
is increasing in s which implies F1(s) > F0(s) for all s (first order stochastic dominance).
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Notice that this assumption means that higher values of the signal are more likely in case of
scandal. Furthermore, we will also assume that lims→+∞ ψ(s) = +∞ and lims→−∞ ψ(s) =
0, so that posterior beliefs converge to 0 and 1 when s goes to −∞ and +∞ respectively.
After observing si, each media company simultaneously decides whether to publish an-
nouncing a scandal or whether to fact-check the information received with a new signal.
We assume that fact-checking allows the media to receive a fully informative signal of the
state of the world before deciding whether to publish the scandal or not.
The size of the media market is normalized to 1 and we assume that the revenues from
publishing a scandal are equally split among the media outlets who published the scandal
first. In particular, this means that the revenue from publishing a fact-checked scandal
that was already published by another media outlet without fact-checking is 0.
Publishing fake scandals is costly for media because at the end of the first period, the
state of the world is exogenously revealed and the media outlets that published a fake
scandal are replaced by an equal number of identical ones.
In the second period, the game is repeated. We assume that the value of the market in
the second period is R > 1. The reason for this assumption is that we think of the second
period as a reduced form for all future periods in an infinitely repeated game.
3.3 Analysis
Let’s analyze the model starting from the second period. In the second period there is no
disciplining effect from the possibility of being replaced. Therefore, all media publish, no
matter what the state of the world is. It follows that the utility from staying in the market
in period 2, or the opportunity cost of publishing a fake scandal, is c = RN .
Let’s now move to period 1: each media infers the state of the world conditional on the
signal they received using Bayesian updating. Given the prior p that there is a scandal,
each media updates according to the posterior:
pˆ(s) =
pf1(s)
pf1(s) + (1− p)f0(s) , (3.1)
Lemma 1. pˆ(s) is increasing in s and the image of pˆ is (0, 1).
Proof. All proofs can be found in the appendix.
Let’s for a moment focus on a single media company. Denote by rj the revenue from
publishing without fact-checking conditional on the state ω = j for j ∈ {0, 1}. Finally,
let’s define by γ ∈ [0, 1] the probability that none of the other media publish a scandal
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without fact checking conditional on the scandal being true. Notice that these quantities
depend on the equilibrium behaviour of the media firms and will be made endogenous in
the following pages. For now, assume that R > N , meaning that c is large enough such
that c > 1: in other words, publishing a certainly fake news is worse than not publishing;
moreover, notice that by construction r1 ≥ 1N , since at worst all media publish without
fact-checking and the revenue is 1N .
Lemma 2. When N = 1, the monopolist media always fact-checks the scandal. When
N > 1, in any equilibrium a media outlet uses a strategy characterized by a cut-off point
s∗, such that the media outlet publishes if s > s∗ and fact-checks otherwise.
From the perspective of the monopolist, fact checking is always better than publishing
directly, because she does not face the risk that another media publishes without fact-
checking, leaving her without market revenues. On the contrary, when there are more
than two firms, they have to trade-off the informational gain of fact-checking with the
probability of having less revenues either because another media published without fact-
checking or because if they publish after fact-checking the revenues are always split with
all other media.
We still need to prove the existence of the equilibrium. In particular, let’s consider a
symmetric equilibrium. From the previous lemma we know that if s∗ is the threshold that
characterizes the equilibrium strategy of a media outlet, it has to be that γ = F1(s
∗)N−1.
Moreover, in a symmetric equilibrium, we can also rewrite the expressions of rj as functions
of s∗. In particular:
rj =
N−1∑
k=0
1
k + 1
(
N − 1
k
)
(1− Fj(s∗))kFj(s∗)N−1−k
First of all, we will prove that the expected revenues of publishing increase in the thresh-
old s∗ used by the opponents. In other words, rj is an increasing function of s∗.
Lemma 3. rj =
1
N
1−Fj(s∗)N
1−Fj(s∗) and rj is strictly increasing in s
∗.
The fact that rj is strictly increasing in s
∗ means that the revenue from publishing
without fact-checking is higher if the other media require a higher threshold for publishing.
This gives the media outlet an incentive to publish without fact checking. However, a
larger s∗ also translates into a lower probability of direct publishing for the other media.
Therefore, also fact checking becomes more profitable, since it becomes less likely that one
of the competitors published without fact-checking.
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Having characterized the revenues from publishing, we can go back to our equilibrium
in cutoff strategies. A symmetric equilibrium requires the following fixed-point equation
to hold:
s∗ = pˆ−1
(
c− r0
c− r0 + r1 − F1(s∗)N−1N
)
.
Theorem 1. The game has a unique symmetric equilibrium, in which all media outlets
publish the news without fact-checking if s > s∗ and fact-check if s ≤ s∗.
The fact that c−r0
c−r0+r1−F1(s
∗)N−1
N
is decreasing in s∗ means that from the perspective of
an individual media outlet, higher standards in the industry (i.e. a higher s∗) mean a
lower indifference point in terms pˆ(s) to publish without fact checking. In other words,
this model describes an environment in which there is an incentive to free ride on the high
fact-checking standards of the media industry.
What can we say about the threshold s∗ that media outlets use to decide whether to fact
check or publish? A natural questions concerns the amount of information that will make
media indifferent between the two options. The following lemma finds sufficient conditions
for pˆ(s∗) to be larger or smaller than p. In the case of pˆ(s∗) > p, media outlets only ever
report a scandal when the information they receive makes them more confident than the
prior about the existence of the scandal. In other words, the bar for publication is higher
than the prior. If instead pˆ(s∗) < p, there are situations in which the evidence is against
the scandal but the outlet nonetheless decides to publish. Whereas we rule out fully fake
news with the assumption that R < N , publishing a scandal despite evidence going against
it might also be considered a (slightly milder) version of fake news.
Lemma 4. In equilibrium, if N < (1−p)R+p, then pˆ(s∗) > p. If p > R−1R , then pˆ(s∗) < p.
We will see in the next section that this property is important for the welfare implications
of the model.
3.3.1 Fact-checking and competition
So far we have proved that there is more fact checking under monopoly than when there
are two or more firms competing. In the next proposition we generalize this result to an
arbitrary increase in the number of firms:
Proposition 1. Increasing the number of firms decreases fact-checking, i.e. s∗ decreases
in N .
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The intuition of the result is the following: an increase in the number of firms makes
fact-checking less profitable because it increases the probability that another firm publishes
without fact-checking and it also increases the number of firms to share the revenues with
in case no other media publishes without fact-checking. Moreover, sharing the market with
a larger number of firms decreases the value of being in the market in the second period.
As a result, increasing N leads media outlets to have lower standards for publishing a
scandal. This result can be seen as a caveat to the reliability of competitive markets to
deliver informative and fact-based media commentary, as maintained by the proponents of
the theory of the marketplace of ideas.
3.3.2 Large N scenarios
The analysis above rests on the assumption that N < R. This assumption makes sure that
the profits from publishing a fake news as a monopolist, given by 1, are smaller than the
value of remaining in the market, given by RN . Therefore, when R < N no fake news in
the most strict sense are published: conditional on being certain about the scandal, media
outlets only publish true scandals. In other words, once fact-checking has taken place, only
true news are published.
What happens if N > R ? If nobody published fake news after the fact-checking stage,
since N > R any firm would have an incentive to unilaterally deviate and publish indepen-
dently of the results of fact checking. Similarly, it cannot be the case that all firms publish
with probability one independently of the fact-checking outcome. If that were the case, in
fact, it would always be optimal to publish after receiving the leak rather than waiting. It
follows that in any equilibrium with N > R, media outlets must mix when fact-checking
reveals the scandal to be fake: this in turn means that in equilibrium, the expected return
from publishing a fake news has to be equal to the cost RN . Other than that, the main
features of the equilibrium remain the same as in the N < R case, and in particular the
characterization of the strategy in the first stage does not change. We can summarize this
in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. When N > R, media outlets follow a cutoff strategy in the first stage,
with s∗ being described by the same condition as in the game with N < R. Conditional on
fact-checking, media outlets always publish true scandals whereas they publish fake scandals
with probability 1− σ increasing in N .
Notice that as N goes to infinity, σ converges to zero, meaning that fake scandals are
published with higher and higher probability even after fact-checking. Moreover, notice
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that independently of the mixing, even in the N > R game news published at the fact
checking stage are more informative of a scandal than news published without fact checking,
since true scandals are always published and fake scandals are always published with lower
probability after fact checking compared to before fact checking. The reason for this is
that, in equilibrium, 1−F0(s
∗)N
1−F0(s∗) = R −
1−F1(s∗)N−1
1−F1(s∗)
pˆ
1−pˆ < R. As a result, it has to be the
case that σ > F0(s
∗), meaning that publication when the news is fake is more likely in the
first stage.
3.4 Fact-checking and Political Accountability
This section adds an electoral choice to our model of media competition in order to eval-
uate how media behaviour influences the choices of voters, therefore influencing whether
politicians are re-elected or ousted from office.
There are two candidates. Each of them can be corrupt or honest, depending on whether
he is involved in a scandal or not. The utility from electing a clean candidate is 1, that
from electing a dirty one is normalized at zero. Assume that both candidates have the
same ex ante quality, meaning that they have the same unconditional probability of being
dirty, and for the time being let’s assume that voters and media outlets assign the same
prior probability to the candidate being dirty, denoted by p as in the above analysis.
Moreover, let’s assume that only the incumbent can be involved in a scandal newspapers
can write about (for example because scandals involve their behaviour in office, or because
the scandal of the incumbent will only be realized if he or she are elected). We will assume
that voters are fully rational and update their prior by both reading about a scandal and
not reading about a scandal (in other words, no news is good news).
In this section we will assume that readers only consult one media outlet. Since politi-
cians are characterized by the same prior p, all that matters for the electoral choice is
the direction of the update and not the size. Therefore, the electoral decision is the same
independent of whether the reader consumes a fact-checked or a non-fact checked piece of
news: any informative news of a scandal will lead to the dismissal of the incumbent in
favour of the challenger 6 One explanation for that might be that readers do not know the
timing of the leak and therefore cannot infer from the timing of publication whether the
news is fact-checked or not 7.
6An extension of the model with different priors p for challenger and incumbent would make the intensity
of information important.
7Amodel exploring the dynamics connected to the timing of leaks is Gratton (2016), in which the credibility
of news depends on the timing of the release.
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For maximum simplicity, let’s first assume that the economy is composed of only one
reader 8. The first scenario we are going to analyze is one in which the reader picks
randomly one of the media outlets. The outlet can be the same or change across the two
stages of the game. The question we would like to answer is whether, in this economy,
more media lead to a higher or lower probability of electing an honest politician (which we
sometimes denote as welfare).
As we know from the analysis in the previous section, increasing N decreases the thresh-
old s∗ that each media uses to decide whether to publish without fact checking. As a
result, the reader is more likely to encounter a scandal when consulting the news media
and therefore she is less likely to vote for the incumbent. This means that dirty incumbents
are less likely to be re-elected, but at the same time also clean incumbents are less likely to
be re-elected. The following proposition proves that the trade-off can be resolved in both
ways.
Proposition 3. When the reader selects one outlet randomly, the probability of having a
clean politician in office can increase or decrease with N .
A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for an increase in N to be welfare improving
is therefore that f1(s
∗) > f0(s∗) + Nf1(s∗)F1(s∗)N−1. In other words, the equilibrium
threshold for publication pˆ(s∗) has to be sufficiently larger than p, meaning that media
outlets switch from fact-checking to publishing only when sufficiently bad news about the
scandal arrives. From Lemma 5 we know that this can only happen if N < (1 − p)R + p.
Notice that if fact checking were not possible, the optimal threshold for publication would
be exactly the one distinguishing bad news from good news, i.e. pˆ(s∗) = p. As a result, as
we increase N , the probability of having fact-checking decreases (both mechanically by the
increase in N and indirectly through the decrease in s∗), but at the same time the decrease
in s∗ might be welfare improving given the decreased probability of having fact checking.
In order to consider a case in which fact-checking is not relevant for welfare except that
through s∗, let’s now assume that elections are imminent and that any fact checked news
will therefore necessarily arrive after the new leader has been elected. In this situation, non-
fact checked news actually might serve a socially beneficial purpose, i.e. that of providing
information on a scandal in time for the electoral choice, and in fact we show that increasing
N always increases welfare:
Proposition 4. With imminent elections, increasing N increases welfare if and only if
8With multiple readers, the results of this section would have to account for the probability that a majority
of readers read a media publishing or not publishing the scandal in the first period. However, the
intuition of the results would remain very similar.
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pˆ(s∗) > p.
The intuition of this result is that if fact checking is not useful for electoral purposes, the
optimal publication threshold s∗ is finite. In particular, given the symmetry of the problem,
a media outlet trying to maximize the voter’s welfare would report the scandal if pˆ(s∗) > p
and withhold it if pˆ(s∗) < p. As we have seen from Lemma 5, market competition can
make s∗ lie both above and below this threshold. Therefore, when elections are imminent
increasing the number of media is welfare improving if the market equilibrium makes media
too reluctant to report news of a scandal.
Let’s now consider a different case, in which the reader, instead of selecting a newspaper
at random independently of whether it mentions the scandal or not, reads one among
the outlets (if any) which published the news of the scandal. In this case, compared to
the previous one, the reader never misses a non-fact checked news. This means that if
the politician is corrupt, the reader always ends up knowing it, either through a non-fact
checked or through a fact checked news. As a result, all corrupt leaders are voted out of
office, but some clean ones are, too. The expression for welfare becomes the following:
1− p2 − p(1− p)(1− F0(s∗)N )
From this expression, it is immediate to see that as N increases, welfare decreases, since
F0(s
∗) decreases.
Proposition 5. If readers read one outlet among those (if any) which talk about the cor-
ruption scandal, then welfare decreases as N increases.
This results tells us that as N increases, welfare increases only if the standards for
publication of a scandal become stricter, i.e. s∗ increases. However, we showed that what
happens is exactly the opposite. The intuition for the welfare decrease is that with many
media, it is more likely that one will get a high enough signal for publication. As a result,
a reader will be very likely to find a scandal in the news and therefore to vote for the
challenger even if the incumbent is clean.
Notice that both our welfare results point out that in the internet age, in which decreased
entry barriers for media led to an increase in the number of outlets N , the resulting
competitive pressure might be detrimental for welfare. The reason is that fact-checking
is more likely to be election-relevant and that, at the same time, readers are more easily
exposed to media mentioning a scandal (for example through social media). As a result,
when evaluating the effect of the number of media on welfare, details such as the electoral
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relevance of fact checks and readers selection of the outlet to consult play a fundamental
role.
3.5 Discussion
In this section we will discuss some key elements of the model and possible future extensions.
The first fundamental ingredient is the initial signal, that we assume all media receive
at the same time. A particularly interesting extension of our model would be to have leaks
being spread by interest groups acting strategically. For example, an interest group siding
with the challenger might have the interest to spread scandals concerning the incumbent.
In this extended game, leakers could have either the timing of the information (in a similar
fashion as in Gratton, Holden, and Kolotilin (2016)), or the number of outlets receiving
the leak, or even the realization of the signal s.
Another possible extension would be to allow media outlets to invest in fact-checking
(for example by employing investigative journalists). This would be reminiscent of indus-
trial organization models of investment in the quality of products with varying degrees of
competition.
The other key element of our model is the cost for publishing a fake scandal, which
we consider exogenous (it might represent for example libel lawsuits). In real journalism,
however, it is often up to competitors to expose as fake the scandal raised by another media
outlet. Allowing for similar dynamics could be a significant addition to our model.
Finally, our political accountability results rest on the assumption that politicians have a
fixed type, either honest or corrupt. However, it would be interesting to model corruption
as an endogenous choice of politicians. In an environment where many fake scandals make
the news, politicians might have a stronger incentive to become corrupt, as in a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper shows that increasing the competitive pressure to break a news can lead media
outlets to be less demanding in the amount of evidence required to publish a story. In
particular, we consider a case in which media outlets can accuse a politician of being
involved in a scandal prior to an election: we show that when readers consult with priority
one (if any) of the media talking about a scandal, then increasing the number of competitors
decreases the probability of having a clean politician in office. Our results aim to pose a
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caveat to the claim that media pluralism always benefits democracy, suggesting that an
increase in competition in the media sector might be socially damaging.
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Appendix 3.A Proofs
Lemma 1. pˆ(s) is increasing in s and the image of pˆ is (0, 1).
Proof.
pˆ(s) =
pf1(s)
pf1(s) + (1− p)f0(s) =
p
p+ 1−pψ(s)
And
pˆ′(s) =
p(1− p)
(pψ(s) + (1− p))2ψ
′(s) > 0
Finally, the image of pˆ is the set (0, 1) because pˆ is a continuous function and the lims→+∞ pˆ(s) =
1 and lims→−∞ pˆ(s) = 0.
Lemma 2. When N = 1, the monopolist media always fact-checks the scandal. When
N > 1, in any equilibrium media uses a strategy characterized by a cut-off point s∗, such
that the media publishes if s ≥ s∗ and fact-checks otherwise.
Proof. The pay-off from publishing the news is Π1 = pˆ(s)r1 + (1 − pˆ(s))(r0 − c). The
pay-off from fact-checking is Π0 = pˆ(s)
γ
N . The indifference point is such that Π1 = Π0 and
it yields the following condition:
pˆ(s∗) =
c− r0
c− r0 + r1 − γN
. (3.2)
The right-hand-side is a constant and bounded by 0 and 1. To see that it is higher than 0
notice that both the numerator and the denominator are positive. The numerator because
by definition r0 ≤ 1 and c > 1, the denominator because r1 ≥ 1N ≥ γN . It is lower than one
because the numerator is always lower than the denominator (strictly if N > 1).
The left-hand-side is increasing in s and the range is (0, 1). Therefore, there always exists
a unique s∗ that solves the indifference condition and, in any equilibrium, media publishes
the scandal if s ≥ s∗ and fact checks otherwise.
Lemma 3. rj =
1
N
1−Fj(s∗)N
1−Fj(s∗) and rj is strictly increasing in s
∗.
Proof. First notice that
1
k + 1
(
N − 1
k
)
=
1
k + 1
(N − 1)!
k!(N − 1− k)! =
1
N
N !
(k + 1)!(N − 1− k)! =
1
N
(
N
k + 1
)
.
Plugging-in this identity in rj and multiplying and dividing by 1− Fj(s∗) we get:
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rj =
1
N
1
1− Fj(s∗)
N−1∑
k=0
(
N
k + 1
)
(1− Fj(s∗))k+1Fj(s∗)N−1−k
Let’s then add and subtract 1N
Fj(s
∗)N
1−Fj(s∗) . We can now rewrite the expression as:
rj =
1
N
1
1− Fj(s∗)
N−1∑
k=−1
(
N
k + 1
)
(1− Fj(s∗))k+1Fj(s∗)N−1−k − 1
N
Fj(s
∗)N
1− Fj(s∗) .
Now, substituting k = k′ − 1, we have that the summation of the previous equation is
simply the sum of the probabilities of all possible events of a discrete binomial distribution
which have to sum 1. Therefore we are left with
rj =
1
N
1− Fj(s∗)N
1− Fj(s∗)
In order to show that this expression is increasing in s∗ we can use the well known
formula for the summation of a geometric series to get:
rj =
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
Fj(s
∗)k
and it is immediate to verify that this is increasing in s∗, given that for any k ≥ 0, Fj(s∗)
is increasing in s∗.
Theorem 1. The game has a unique symmetric equilibrium, in which all media publish
the news without fact-checking if s > s∗ and fact-check if s ≤ s∗.
Proof. In equilibrium, the following has to hold:
pˆ(s∗) =
c− r0
c− r0 + r1 − F1(s∗)N−1N
We know that pˆ(s∗) is strictly increasing in s∗, approaching 0 as s∗ goes to −∞ and
approaching 1 as s∗ goes to +∞. As far as the right hand side is concerned, we can
rewrite it as: 1
1+
r1−F1(s
∗)N−1/N
c−r0
. We know that as s∗ goes to +∞, rj and Fj(s∗) go to 1.
If s∗ goes to −∞, on the other hand, rj goes to 1N and Fj(s∗) goes to 0. It follows that
lims∗→+∞ c−r0
c−r0+r1−F1(s
∗)N−1
N
= c−1c−1/N < 1 and lims∗→−∞
c−r0
c−r0+r1−F1(s
∗)N−1
N
= c−1/Nc > 0
and we can see that ∀N > 1 c−1c−1/N < c−1/Nc , since 1 + (N − 2)cN > 0. This means that
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lims∗→−∞ c−r0
c−r0+r1−F1(s
∗)N−1
N
> lims∗→+∞ c−r0
c−r0+r1−F1(s
∗)N−1
N
. Moreover, it is immediate to
verify that c−r0
c−r0+r1−F1(s
∗)N−1
N
is continuous. In order to show that it is strictly decreasing,
let’s focus on the ratio r1−F1(s
∗)N−1/N
c−r0 . It is immediate to verify that the denominator is
decreasing in s∗, since r0 increases in s∗. As far as the numerator is concerned, we can
rewrite it as 1N
1−F1(s∗)N
1−F1(s∗) − 1NF1(s∗)N−1. This can be rearranged into N−1N 1N−1
1−F1(s∗)N−1
1−F1(s∗)
which is just N−1N r1(N − 1), i.e. it is proportional to the revenue when the number of
players is N − 1 instead of N . Since r1 is increasing in s∗ for all N , this is also in-
creasing in s∗. Therefore, c−r0
c−r0+r1−F1(s
∗)N−1
N
is strictly decreasing in s∗. However, since
pˆ is strictly increasing in s∗ and since lims∗→−∞ pˆ(s∗) < lims∗→−∞ c−r0
c−r0+r1−F1(s
∗)N−1
N
and
lims∗→+∞ pˆ(s∗) > lims∗→+∞ c−r0
c−r0+r1−F1(s
∗)N−1
N
, there exists a unique s∗ solving the above
equation. Hence the symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique.
Lemma 4. In equilibrium, if N < (1−p)R+p, then pˆ(s∗) > p. If p > R−1R , then pˆ(s∗) < p.
Proof. Consider the indifference condition pˆ(s∗) =
(
c−r0
c−r0+r1−F1(s
∗)N−1
N
)
. The right-hand
side takes values in ( c−1
c− 1
N
,
c−1/N
c ) A sufficient condition for pˆ(s
∗) > p is therefore that
p < c−1
c− 1
N
. We can rewrite this as c >
1− p
N
1−p . On the other hand, a sufficient condition for
pˆ(s∗) < p is that p > c−1/Nc , which can be rewritten as p >
R−1
R .
Proposition 1. Increasing the number of firms decreases fact-checking.
Proof. Let s∗ be the equilibrium threshold. Thus s∗ solves the indifference condition:
pˆ(s∗) =
c− r0
c− r0 + r1 − F1(s∗)N−1N
Now, let’s keep s∗ fixed. Notice that the left-hand-side of the indifference condition does
not depend on N , which enters only on the right-hand side. The right-hand side of the
expression can be rewritten as
{
1 +
1
N
1−F1(s
∗)N−1
1−F1(s
∗)
R
N
− 1
N
1−F0(s
∗)N
1−F0(s
∗)
}−1
. Let’s focus on the ratio contained
in this term. We can cancel out 1N and it is straightforward to check that, increasing N and
fixing s∗, the numerator increases while the denominator decreases. Hence, the right hand
side of the indifference condition decreases; therefore an increase in N , has to decrease
pˆ(s∗) and this happens only if s∗ decreases. Thus, s∗ is decreasing in N for all N .
Proposition 2. When the reader selects one outlet randomly, the probability of having a
clean politician in office can increase or decrease with N .
89
Proof. The probability of having a clean politician in office is p((1−F1(s∗)+F1(s∗)N )(1−
p) + (1− p)(1− F0(s∗))p+ (1− p)F0(s∗) This can be rearranged to yield:
W = (1− p)2 + p(1− p)[1− F1(s∗) + F1(s∗)N + F0(s∗)]
Taking the derivative with respect to N results in the following expression:
p(1− p) [−f1(s∗) + f0(s∗) +Nf1(s∗)F1(s∗)N−1] ∂s∗
∂N
+ F1(s
∗)N lnF1(s∗),
which is not unambiguously positive or negative.
Proposition 3. With imminent elections, increasing N increases welfare if and only if
pˆ(s∗) > p.
Proof. In this scenario, welfare can be expressed in the following way:
(1− p)2 + p(1− p)(1 + F0(s∗)− F1(s∗))
Notice that since F0(s
∗) ≥ F1(s∗) and lims∗→∞ F0(s∗) = lims∗→∞ F1(s∗), in this case
welfare is maximized when f0(s
∗) = f1(s∗). Notice that by definition of pˆ, f1(s∗) = f0(s∗)
implies that pˆ(s∗) = p. Therefore, we can use Lemma 5 to characterize sufficient conditions
for pˆ(s∗) to lie above or below p.
Proposition 4. If readers read one outlet among those (if any) which talk about the cor-
ruption scandal, then welfare decreases as N increases.
Proposition 5. When N > R, media outlets follow a cutoff strategy in the first stage, with
s∗ being the same as in the game with N < R. Conditional on fact-checking, media outlets
always publish true scandals whereas they publish fake scandals with probability 1− σ.
Proof. Let’s start from the second stage, i.e. after fact-checking has taken place. If the
scandal is true, all firms publish it. If the scandal is wrong and no firm publishes it, then
each firm as the incentive to unilaterally deviate and publish it, since the monopolistic
revenue 1 is larger than RN . At the same time, if all firms were to publish the fake scandal,
then it would be optimal to always publish the scandal in the first without fact-checking.
It follows that media outlets must mix when the scandal is proved to be fake. Using an
analogous formula to (3.2), where σ denotes the probability of not publishing the fake news
after fact-checking, the expected revenue from publishing a fake news, given that all other
media outlets use the same strategy, is 1N
1−σN
1−σ . In equilibrium, this expected revenue
90
has to equal the cost RN . Notice that if N > R, there always exists a σ < 1 such that
1
N
1−σN
1−σ =
R
N . To see this, rearrange the condition to get
1−σN
1−σ = R. The left-hand side is a
strictly increasing function of σ with image in [1, N ]. As a result, there is a unique σ ∈ (0, 1)
such that the condition is satisfied. Let’s now move to the analysis of the first stage, i.e.
the decision to fact check. The only change compared to the case of N < R is in the case of
the news being fake. However, we just proved that the expected revenue from publishing
conditional on fact-cehecking indicating that the scandal is fake is equal to zero. Therefore,
the payoff for the media outlet conditional on fact-checking and the scandal being fake is
the same as before. This means that the indifference condition determining s∗ remains
the same. In terms of existence of the equilibrium, since the indifference condition is the
same, the only change concerns the limit of the right hand side c−r0
c−r0+r1−F1(s
∗)N−1
N
as s∗
goes to infinity, represented by c−1
c− 1
N
. Whereas with N < R this limit is strictly positive,
since c > 1, as N grows larger c becomes smaller than 1 and c−1
c− 1
N
tends to −∞. In other
words, compared to the case of N < R, pˆ at the equilibrium s∗ is no longer bounded below,
meaning that as N grows, the cutoff s∗ grows smaller and smaller.
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